Attentional bias and addictive behaviour by Ryan, Francis Noel
THE UNIVERSITY of EDINBURGH
Title Attentional bias and addictive behaviour
Author Ryan, Francis Noel
Qualification DPsychol
Year 1998
Thesis scanned from best copy available: may
contain faint or blurred text, and/or cropped or
missing pages.
Digitisation notes:
• p.52 missing from original numeration.
Scanned as part of the PhD Thesis Digitisation project
http://libraryblogs.is.ed.ac.uk/phddigitisation
ATTENTIONAL BIAS AND ADDICTIVE BEHAVIOUR
Francis Noel Ryan
Submitted in fulfilment of the regulations for the degree of Doctor of Psychology.
THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH
(Regulation
3.5.13)
Name of Candidate ..
Address
Degree




ATTENTIONAL BIAS AND ADDICTIVE BEHAVIOUR
No. of words in the main text of Thesis
30,000
The relationship between attentional bias and aspects of alcohol use was investigated. A
modified Stroop procedure was administered to detoxified problem drinkers (N=33)
attending a specialist day clinic and staff specialising in substance misuse treatment
(N=32). The card format Stroop procedure contained words such as "alcohol" and
"relapse" and neutral semantically homogenous words. It was predicted that the problem
drinking cohort would show greater colour naming latency with alcohol relevant words
compared to the neutral words than the control group. It was also hypothesised that
significant relationships would emerge between indices of alcohol consumption and Stroop
interference. Analysis of variance revealed significant main effects for word type with
both alcoholic and "expert" subjects taking longer to colour-name alcohol related words
(p<.001). Predicted interactions between word type and clinical status of subject were
not observed. This result was consistent with earlier findings that expertise or familiarity
were influential factors in Stroop performance and highlights the need to control for this
in future research with alcoholic subjects. Multiple regression analysis with the entire
sample (N=65) showed that equations with the Severity of Alcohol Dependence
Questionnaire (S.A.D.Q.), the average quantity of alcohol consumed per drinking
occasion and the number of years regular drinking were significantly predictive of colour
naming latency for alcohol related words (p<.001). The quantity of alcohol reportedly
consumed on each occasion was negatively predictive of Stroop interference, contrary to
prediction. Overall, the regression equation is consistent with an acquired information
processing bias related to dimensions of alcohol use and dependence. Theoretical and
clinical implications discussed include the role of automaticity in addictive behaviour and
predicting and preventng relapse.
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"Life's aim, if it has one, is to be always looking for temptations. "
Oscar Wilde
Introduction and Overview
Cognitive processes have become the target for investigation in a wide range of
psychological disorders. It is now clear that individuals experiencing clinically
significant levels of emotional or behavioural dysregulation tend to process
information deemed relevant to their concerns differently from their unaffected peers.
Thus, when depressed, a person will react differently when required to recall personal
memories than when feeling less depressed (Clark and Teasdale, 1982); the anxious
individual will react differently to a threatening experience compared to less anxious
controls (Mathews and MacLeod, 1985).
With regard to substance misuse and addictive behaviour, therapeutic approaches
based on learning theory and its derivatives have led to increased understanding of the
mechanisms underlying the acquisition, maintenance and regulation of addictive
behaviours. Historically, addictive behaviour was accounted for in terms of classical
and operant conditioning processes (Wikler, 1948). This influence continues (e.g.
Stewart ,deWit & Eikelboom 1983) but increasingly social learning theory (Marlatt
and Gordon, 1985; Miller and Hestor,1989) has provided the integrative theoretical
framework from which therapeutic interventions are derived. Predictably, cognitive
products such as expectancies and attributions feature prominently in these accounts
although they are essentially viewed as mediational factors intervening between
stimulus and response.
The quest for greater understanding of the regulatory or mediational role of cognitive
processes has gained momentum in recent years as experimental findings were
applied to understanding and intervening with emotional disorders. (See Williams,
Watts, MacLeod and Mathews, 1988 for a review). These authors preface their review
by highlighting the distinction between conscious cognitive processes and their
products ( e.g. self reports) and non-conscious processes such as encoding or
retrieval. They assert that procedures developed in therapeutic practice (e.g. Beck ,
Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979; Beck and Emery , 1985,p.8) , while often robust in the
clinic, give "conceptual primacy" to conscious cognition at the expense of non-
conscious processes.
Even if more recent schema-based therapies (e.g. Young, 1990; Padesky 1994) imply
that schemata formed in response to early vulnerability experiences are not reportable
until the "discovery" process of therapy is at work, the emphasis remains firmly on
the products of such structures ( e.g. negative thoughts or dysfunctional assumptions)
rather than processes such as selective retrieval or attentional bias. Brewin (1988)
refers to experimental cognitive psychology and social cognitive psychology as
traditions which respectively focus on information processing per se and on a
narrower agenda based on phenomena such as expectancies which can be accessed by
self-report.
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The duality of cognitive systems proposed by theorists (e.g. Eysenck, 1992; Williams
et al, 1988; Brewin, 1988; Dixon 1981) has led to speculation about the possible role
such systems might play in the regulation of behaviour. The origins of such
theorising, however, lie firmly in the cognitive psychology laboratory with awareness
of psychotherapeutic applications coming later. A typical experimental study (Shifffin
& Schneider, 1977) used varied or consistent mapping in a visual search task to
demonstrate the relative strengths and weaknesses of what were termed controlled and
automatic processes.
Control processes are conscious, flexible and effective at dealing with variable, novel
situations but have limited capacity and are therefore slow. Automatic processes are ,
once established, fast and, by definition, autonomous as well as being relatively
resistant to overload but not capacity-free as evidenced by colour naming delays in
tasks such as the emotional or modified Stroop paradigm (e.g. Mathews & MacLeod,
1985) which will be looked at in more detail below. Further, as has been
demonstrated by Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) automatic processes can disrupt
controlled or conscious processing while remaining relatively resistant to strategic
manipulation.
More recent accounts have emphasised the continuous nature of automaticity (Cohen,
Dunbar & McClelland, 1990; MacLeod & Dunbar, 1988), based on both simulated
and empirical data. Thus a novel task can initially fulfil the criteria associated with
controlled processing in terms of speed (or its absence) and capacity but can acquire
the attributes of automaticity with practice. In this connectionist framework the
evolution of automaticity is based on a gradual transition of information processing
from "indirect" to "direct" pathways, corresponding in part to the controlled -
automatic distinction but not sharing the implied dichotomy.
Leaving aside these important questions for the moment, the implication in the present
context is that it is possible for automatic (or direct) processes to produce the same
outcomes or effects regardless of whether these are " in concert with or in opposition
to one's intentions " (Jacoby, Ste-Marie and Toth 1993 p. 277). While this assertion
did not directly address addictive behaviour, the implications are nonetheless relevant:
to those who experience or observe this behaviour it is often the case that it occurs
regardless of prior undertakings to the contrary, however robustly stated.
Intentionality and its limits bring the idea of choice into focus or, in informational
terms, "the narrowing down of alternatives" (Neisser, 1967, p.7). This also has a
strong, if originally unintended, resonance for the subject matter of the present study,
which it is now appropriate to introduce.
As a starting point, it is asserted that models of human cognitive functioning have
clear relevance to addictive behaviour although at the inception of the present study
this was not reflected in the available literature. The present study sought to place this
presumed relevance on an empirical basis. Firstly, the possibility that individuals with
clinically significant alcohol problems would show evidence of attentional bias
inferred from performance on a modified Stroop procedure was investigated by
comparing their performance to a selected control group. Secondly, the nature of the
2
relationship between any observed Stroop interference and indices of the severity and
chronicity of alcohol problems was explored.
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF ADDICTIVE BEHAVIOUR
The spectrum of addictions common in contemporary society is the largest
preventable cause of morbidity and mortality. With regard to alcohol misuse and
dependency, indications are that there has been a steady increase in per capita
consumption since 1945 with a proportionate escalation in associated medical, social
and psychological problems. Recent survey data emphasise that regular alcohol
consumption is the norm with only 7% of men and 14% of women reporting that they
never drink alcohol (General Household Survey, 1994). This survey also highlights
the frequency of self-reported drinking in quantities associated with negative health
consequences: for instance nearly one third of men in the 16-45 age group regularly
drink more than 21 standard units per week. Estimates based on this survey suggest
that 7% of the adult population can be classed as problem drinkers.





Miller & Kurtz (1994)
Respectively, these models depict the alcoholic as immoral, immature, helpless (due
to genetic or biologically determined factors) and spiritually bankrupt. The pejorative
tone is perhaps accentuated by the cryptic summary which nonetheless reflects what
were genuine attempts to explain puzzling and apparently self-destructive behaviour.
In socio-medical domains the second and third models have informed treatment
approaches emphasising the irreversible disease-like characteristics such as
progressive loss of control (Jellinek, 1960). This approach has retained its influence
and the imperative of verbal acknowledgement of the problem remains manifest in
contemporary treatment approaches (e.g. Gorski & Miller, 1986). Reluctance to do
this was frequently interpreted as "denial", the strength of which was assumed to
correlate with the severity of the problem. Uniquely perhaps, this disorder was
characterised by an inverse relationship between the self-reports of the afflicted and
the considered opinion of the appraiser.
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Psychologists have attempted to account for addictive behaviour by applying models
from learning theory. Two important premises defined these efforts: recognition of the
role of environmental events or contingencies and a dimensional view of addictive
behaviour implying variation and reversibility. In contrast to the traditional disease
model which in effect set the addict apart from the general population by virtue of
pathological genetic, physiological, personality or even spiritual features, the
psychological view implied a continuum of drug using behaviours along which the
controlled social drinker or recreational drug user would differ from the problem
drinker or drug taker in mainly quantitative terms. At least two strands of evidence
support this view. Firstly there is extensive evidence of individuals deemed alcoholic
resuming drinking in apparently controlled ways, although pronouncements of this
nature become more equivocal the longer the follow up period is (see Heather and
Robertson, 1981 for a detailed review). Secondly, and more directly, researchers have
demonstrated that alcoholics can regulate their drinking. Mello and Mendelson
(1972), for example, demonstrated that inpatient alcoholics deferred gratification
when allowed to earn tokens which could be exchanged for alcohol: they remained
abstinent for days in order to accumulate tokens for alcoholic binges. Leaving aside
the ethical aspects of this study, it does provide evidence that refutes the hypothesis
that there is loss of control in some absolute sense. The issue of control or self-
regulation remains crucial in accounting for and responding to addictive behaviours
however and it certainly appears safe to conclude that control is impaired, but not
absolutely in specific contexts.
This does not discount the possibility of individual dispositional factors influencing
the development of addictive disorders although identifying these requires prospective
research methods. Vaillant (1983) highlighted the role of socio-cultural factors rather
than individual psychological variables (with the significant exception of childhood
conduct and attentional problems) in his account of an impressive longitudinal study
spanning more than thirty years. Evidence pointed to parental alcohol abuse leading to
emotional and behavioural disturbance in offspring who were in turn more at risk of
alcohol problems in adulthood. Thus it could be concluded that the observed
relationship between adult mental health problems (Glass & Jackson, 1988, reported
this to be up to 40%, albeit with a hospital rather than a community sample) and
alcohol problems is due in part to parental alcohol abuse which was in part fostered by
cultural mores uncritical of such behaviour or yet more familial alcohol abuse. Further
discussion of these issues has to be curtailed in the present text where the focus is on
adults with established and chronic alcohol problems.
In this regard it is therefore necessary to qualify the dimensional view of alcohol use
disorders referred to above. Individuals who progress along a continuum of increasing
alcohol abuse culminating in referral for specialist help report common patterns of
alcohol consumption (e.g. drinking to relieve withdrawal symptoms) together with
emotional, neuro-cognitive, interpersonal, medical and social problems that are by
convention grouped together as a syndrome. This is in essence what clinicians, and
their clients, commonly refer to as alcoholism. The cognitive and behavioural aspects
of the syndrome remain relatively malleable however and thus provide the rationale
for therapeutic intervention.
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Behavioural and Cognitivefactors andAddictive Behaviour
As discussed in the foregoing addictive behaviour attracted the interest of
psychological researchers who applied a learning theory framework. The paradigms
used reflected those in mainstream experimental psychology. Early work (e.g. Wikler,
1948) generally applied conditioning models but increasingly cognitive social
learning models have been applied (e.g. Marlatt & Gordon, 1985). Both of these
traditions have generated therapeutic applications in the form of cue exposure and
cognitive behavioural therapy respectively. The dichotomy is arbitrary to some extent
as both approaches are rooted in learning theory and the pivotal role ascribed to
craving in the social learning account. It is justified however by the contrasting
therapeutic applications that have been derived: cognitive behavioural applications
tend not to formalise cue exposure procedures, instead relying on naturalistic exposure
to environmental cues to establish beliefs that craving, while difficult to resist, is
responsive to effortful coping given the necessary coping repertoire. The reader is
referred to Wilson (1987) for a more detailed account of cognitive factors in
understanding and treating addictive behaviours.
Cue Exposure
Therapeutic interventions based on exposure to stimuli linked in the learning history
with drug using behaviour aim to neutralise the conditioned reactions to salient drug
cues in a manner analogous to exposing a phobic individual to their feared stimulus.
While cue exposure does not eschew the role of cognitive events and products (
Niaura, Rosenhow, Binkoff, Monti, Pedraza and Abrahms , 1988) , neither does it lose
sight of its behaviourist origins. Conceptually at least, conditioned cue reactivity
(CCR) can occur in an essentially non-verbal, situationist mode. CCRs are assumed to
reflect the psychobiological stratum of craving manifested commonly in sub-clinical
withdrawal states. In this sense it contrasts with, or perhaps complements, models that
highlight the role of cognitive factors (e.g. Marlatt & Gordon, 1985). An important
difference between cue exposure in addiction and in conditions where anxiety is
prominent was pointed out by Powell, Gray, Bradley et al (1990): in addictive
disorders a CCR can be appetitive whereas in anxiety disorders it is aversive. While
CCRs can lead to aversive states in the absence of the consumatory response,
remediation is achieved by an approach behaviour rather than an avoidance response.
The incentive value of drug-relevant cues has featured prominently in recent accounts
of the role of conditioning in resumed or ongoing drug use (Stewart, de Wit and
Eikelboom, 1984). Drawing on behavioural and neuro-pharmacological findings
Stewart and her colleagues have concluded that conditioned stimuli acquire incentive
properties that mimic the positive affective consequences of opiate and stimulant
drugs, and by implication other drugs including alcohol.
In contrast to earlier accounts of the persistence of drug taking which emphasised the
role of avoidance learning or negative reinforcement in the resumption of drug use
(see Wikler, 1948; Wikler and Pescor, 1967; Siegal, 1975), an appetitive motivational
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theory can account for relapse into drug use in the absence of withdrawal symptoms
or physical dependence. Critics of this approach (e.g.Tiffany, 1990) have pointed out
the neglect of operant conditioning mechanisms in accounting for the acquisition of
drug seeking behaviours by animals and human subjects, invoking the need to apply
models of learning that incorporate both classical and operant mechanisms in a
cognitive framework. It should also be bome in mind that much of the earlier work by
researchers such as Wikler and Siegal used animal subjects, which calls into question
the generalisability of such work, particularly when a role for information processing
is included.
Social Learning Theory
From a social-learning theory perspective, the interaction between the individual, the
drug and the environment has been the focus of recent investigation of the process of
relapse or reversal of treatment gains. The influential model proposed by Marlatt and
Gordon (1985) and referred to above highlights the role of so-called high-risk
situations in increasing the likelihood of resuming addictive behaviour patterns.
Influential in determining the outcome of these encounters are four categories of
cognitive processes: efficacy expectations, outcome expectancies, and attributions of
causality and decision-making processes. An individual who has habitually consumed
alcohol, for instance, in socially challenging situations would typically report positive
expectancies regarding this behaviour as a coping strategy in the absence of more
potent self-efficacy beliefs about his ability to cope without the drug of choice.
Combined with attributions that causally link drinking alcohol with sociability in
addition to distortions in decision-making (e.g." seemingly irrelevant decisions") this
pattern of expectancies paves the way for relapse. Following this initial resumption of
drug use, which can be regarded as a first stage of a process of relapse, the individual
engages in a more elaborate appraisal of the situation. This second stage was crucial
in determining the parameters of the relapse: if the first lapse was attributed to
relatively uncontrollable and stable factors (an apt example of this would be a belief
system based on a disease model of alcoholism emphasising its irreversibility and
possible genetic origins), a negative affective reaction (the Abstinence Violation
Effect or AVE) ensued. Guilt or hopelessness in turn led to positive outcome
expectancies regarding further indulgence alleviating the emotional distress.
Therapeutic interventions initially focus on the cognitive factors with re-structuring or
re-appraisal as necessary. Anticipating scenarios where the client reports a
combination of outcome and efficacy beliefs that increase the risk of engaging in the
proscribed behaviour is the aim at this stage. Equipping the individual with the
requisite skills to cope with these situations is the principal therapeutic currency. One
of the strengths of this model is therefore the direct manner it can be applied to devise
focused therapeutic interventions which can include both cognitive re-appraisal and
the enhancement of the participants' coping repertoire. Further, by conceptualising
relapse as a process beginning with a "lapse" the model avoids endorsing the myth of
"one drink, one drunk" and therefore provides the client with a second opportunity to
deploy coping skills taught in therapy.
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Beck, Wright, Newman & Liese (1993) provide a more cognitive account of events
such as relapse by emphasising the role of dysfunctional, facilitative beliefs e.g. "I
need a drink to be happy" which can interact with schematic beliefs about personal
worthlessness or unloveability. It therefore accords a less influential role to situational
or environmental factors. This approach is essentially an application to substance
misuse problems of the concepts and techniques applied widely to emotional and
personality disorders by Beck and his colleagues (e.g. Beck et al 1979; Beck, Freeman
et al (1990).
Empirical Findings
(i) Marlatt & Gordons Relapse Prevention Model (1985)
Both classical conditioning and social-learning theory derived accounts of addictive
behaviour and relapse have generated large bodies of empirical findings
experimentally and clinically, most of which is beyond the scope of the present
review. Of relevance in the present context is the cognitive processing dimension of
cue exposure, specifically with regard to processing bias. Before reviewing relevant
findings from a cognitive perspective more general research evidence bearing on cue
exposure and more cognitive orientated approaches will be discussed.
Empirical support for the Marlatt and Gordon (1985) model comes from questionnaire
data gathered from addicted individuals following relapse. Based on the findings,
relatively little weight is accorded to the role played by cue reactivity per se as a
determinant of resumed drug-taking. The key determinant is the valence of the
outcome expectancy associated with drug-paired cues in specific situations: positive
outcome expectancies facilitate the generation of craving, urges and actual drug use;
negative expectancies will not. This is consistent with the finding that both positive
and negative expectancies about the effects of alcohol on subsequent mood and
behaviour are reliably and congruently associated with actual drinking behaviour
(Brown, 1985). Further, expectancies are predictive of post-treatment progress (Jones
& McMahon, 1994).
Heather, Stallard and Tebbutt (1991) challenged this apparent emphasis on the
cognitive mediation of situational events or emotional states as antecedents of relapse
rather than substance cues per se. They partially replicated Marlatt & Gordon's (1985)
study and questioned the procedure used in evaluating drug users self-reports of recent
relapses. Heather et al (1991) found that individual drug-users rated substance cues
(e.g. "When I saw works or heroin I just had to give in") as the most influential
precipitant of relapse whereas trained raters (albeit with only a 63% rate of agreement)
judged this to be of little or no importance. The raters tended to account for matters in
a manner more consistent with Marlatt and Gordon's (1985) model i.e. attributing
relapse to negative emotional states and social pressure. In a further commentary on
this subject Tiffany (1992) pointed out that the questions posed in the Heather et al.
(1991) study do not in fact directly address craving or urges. While there is an implied
compulsion to use in the above example (". I just had to give in") Tiffany (1992)
interprets this as consistent with the addicts' recognition of their response being
stimulus bound but not necessarily urge driven and presumably regulated by relatively
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automatic cognitive processes. There is no valid means of adjudicating on this issue
without further empirical data. In fact the model described by Tiffany (1992) has yet
to be subjected to direct experimental testing although Tiffany (1990) specifies a
number of ways in which this could be done.
In any case the two explanatory frameworks are not necessarily mutually exclusive:
substance cues are " the final common pathway" (Cooney, Gillespie et al, 1987) that
can of course be preceded by a sequence of intrapersonal and environmental events
such as those proposed by Marlatt and his colleagues. Combined with the self reports
in the Heather et al (1991) study, evidence that CCRs can account for at least some of
the variance of the severity or frequency of relapse (Rohsenow, Niaura et al 1990;
Monti, Abrams et al 1990) points to the need for greater understanding of the role of
cue reactivity in the therapeutic response to addiction.
Other difficulties with the Marlatt account of relapse include the failure to find the
predicted differences in attributional styles between abstainers and relapsers,
suggesting that lifestyle or situational factors accounted for much of the outcome
variance. (Birke et al, 1990) Additionally, a problem with the concept of the AVE is
that in proposing a relationship between commitment to abstinence and subsequent
cognitive-affective reactions it implies that those with the least commitment or
resolve for abstinence will be less affected by initial resumption of drug use and
therefore less likely to proceed from the first stage to continually engaging in the
behaviour. When the relationship between commitment and abstinence has been
investigated (Hall, Harvassy and Wasserman, 1990) the evidence was that those with
the most commitment were less likely to return to continued use following initial use
and hence were less likely to relapse.
(ii) Cue Exposure Applications
Given the variable relationship between cue exposure and cue reactivity it is not
surprising that research attempting to relate cue specific phenomena to therapeutic
gains with clinical samples has produced conflicting results. Powell et al (1990) in a
controlled study demonstrated a significant reduction in CCR and self-reported
craving in a cohort of opiate users given two laboratory based cue-exposure sessions.
These findings were not replicated in a subsequent study (Dawe, Powell et al 1993)
despite increasing the number of cue exposure sessions to six and including an in vivo
component with some participants. When the recipients of the exposure therapy were
compared with controls who were offered similar conventional inpatient care minus
the cue exposure, both groups displayed significant decrements in craving in response
to cue exposure. Outcome at six weeks and six months follow-up was similar for both
groups. The authors speculate that the therapeutic milieu to which both groups were
exposed allowed for frequent and prolonged exposure to salient cues, thus masking
the effects of the formal cue exposure sessions. Weekend home visits were also
allowed towards the end of the programme, thus increasing the possibility of
deconditioning occurring. Given the potentially infinite permutations of cues
available, even in the hospital setting, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to
control for naturalistic or opportunistic exposure. As investigation of cognitive
processes was beyond the scope of this study, the possibility that the assumed
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ubiquity of cues manifested selective or biased attentional processing was not
discussed by the authors. It highlights the need for a more precise account of the role
of cognitive processes in this and similar post-treatment scenarios.
Further problems for theories of drug use which emphasise the role of conditioning as
manifested in the CCR were highlighted by Tiffany (1990). He argued that if CCRs
were indeed reflective of the neurobiological substrate of addiction, strong
relationships between aspects of CCRs such as self-reported urges and physiological
or behavioural components of drug use should occur. This was found not to be the
case however. Of the 13 studies he reviewed where correlations between self-reported
urges or craving and physiological responses such as skin conductance or heart rate
were reported, the average coefficient was .38, rising to .52 when significant results
only were included. A similar picture emerged when self-reported urges were
correlated with alcohol use and cigarette smoking behaviour. Here the average
correlation was .40, rising to .50 when only statistically significant coefficients were
included in the calculation. Tiffany thus calculated that approximately 28% and 25%
of the variance in physiological response to drug cues and actual drug using behaviour
respectively could be accounted for by the magnitude of the self-reported strength of
urge to use. Interpreting these data depends very much on the perspective that is
adopted: while the relationships reported might fall short of what is theoretically
possible, they can hardly be dismissed.
In conclusion, both clinical and experimental findings in cue exposure research
suggest a complex pattern of cue reactivity among addicted individuals. This includes
the absence of any detectable response and highlights the need to evaluate the role of
cognitive processing variables in what is essentially a conditioning paradigm.
Inferentially, from the work of Eysenck (1992) and others it also raises the question of
cognitive avoidance. De Ruiter and Brosschott (1994), for instance, delineate a role
for effortful cognitive avoidance in accounting for delayed colour naming of both
negatively and positively emotionally valenced stimuli. Nonetheless, at least at the
intuitive level, invoking an avoidance process seems less appealing in relation to
addictive behaviour which is defined in terms of approach and acquisition. A cautious
approach to accounting for response latency is certainly called for when findings such
as that reported by Matthews & Sebastian (1993) are considered. This study found
that snake phobic Ss displayed colour naming facilitation rather than the predicted
latency in the actual physical presence of a snake leading the authors to speculate that
this reflected either a narrowing of attention under conditions of heightened arousal or
a prioritisation of the relevant cognitive processing in the face of the threat. This
finding, if robust, has important implications for cue exposure and how it is
investigated. What little evidence that exists with exposure to drug cues suggests that
these disrupt rather than facilitate cognitive performance on competing tasks such as
that devised by Droungas et al (1992).
The extent to which relatively automatised cognitive processes are influential in the
regulation of addictive behaviour is at present unknown although, as will be seen
below, evidence is accumulating that a processing bias might be implicated. While at
present a cognitive processing account of addictive behaviour is not available, in
contrast to anxiety disorders, for instance, a glance at the diagnostic criteria points to
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the potential relevance of a cognitive framework. The ICD classification (WHO,
1992) depicts a behaviour pattern that is subjectively experienced as compelling in the
face of overtly harmful consequences, consistently prioritised over other pursuits and
difficult to control in terms of dosage or frequency of use. In a phrase derived from
the concept of the Alcohol Dependence Syndrome (Edwards and Gross, 1976)
another criterion is a "narrowing of the personal repertoire" of substance misuse. This
is described as a pattern of substance misuse that remains relatively constant across
different settings. These authors also refer to the salience of acquisitive behaviour in
the context of alcohol dependency. In combination, these aspects of disordered
substance use raise significant questions about the cognitive processes involved in a
behaviour that is selective, preferential and apparently autonomous or uncontrolled.
These questions will be addressed in the next section.
WHYSTUD YA TTENTIONAL PROCESSES?
Selective attention to environmental and interoceptive stimuli has now been shown to
be a fundamental attribute of human information processing. This is particularly the
case when threat is adduced. It appears then that when an event is perceived as
threatening a rapid redeployment of cognitive processing resources takes place. These
changes can be involuntary and occur despite attempts at effortful control. A cognitive
perspective has been fruitful in generating theoretical accounts such as hypervigilance
theory (Eysenck, 1992) which delineates a role for pre-attentive and relatively
automatised cognitive processes in maintaining clinical anxiety disorders. In the
context of addictive behaviour, which is defined in part in terms of impaired control,
the need for understanding the cognitive regulatory mechanisms is clear. Given the
necessary selective nature of human information processing a logical starting point for
investigation is whether such bias is detectable with stimuli deemed salient.
Again in common with the anxiety disorders, cue responsivity is crucially significant
in understanding the regulatory dynamics of addictive behaviour. A corollary to this is
that specifying a role for cognitive processes such as selective attention in relation to
addictive behaviour is potentially as illuminating as parallel endeavours have proved
with anxiety disorders. To date researchers in addiction have generally regarded the
relevant cue as a stimulus feature presumably like any other but with the potential to
elicit the necessary appetitive response through conditioning processes mediated by
expectancies or other cognitive processes. This has informed clinical interventions
such as cue exposure with mixed results (e.g. Powell et al 1990; Dawe et al, 1993).
Thus a typical discussion in the consulting room would involve a detoxified client
describing the ubiquity of cues, both environmental and interoceptive, that lead to
thoughts of resuming alcohol or drug use. Given the present state of knowledge the
therapist could not offer much more than the rather circular observation that either the
client is "pre-occupied" with their drug or perhaps that it is difficult to avoid
temptation in a drug orientated society.
to
Cognitive Factors and Cue Exposure
One crucial unanswered question is the non-reactivity of some alcohol dependent
subjects: almost a third of whom fail to react with increased salivation when exposed
to alcohol cues (Rohsenow et al, 1992). These findings question the usefulness of
debating the role of craving through post hoc self-reports, attributions and observer
ratings (Heather et al., 1992; Tiffany, 1992) where no attempt was made to directly
measure craving or urges psychometrically, physiologically or behaviourally.
Moreover it points to limitations in Tiffany's account which states that " some
stimulus configurations" (Tiffany, 1992, p, 132) will elicit action schemata aimed at
drug acquisition. In an attempt to apply a dual cognitive processing model to cue
exposure in the context of drug taking, Tiffany (1992) emphasised the automatic
nature of the drug acquisition and use cycle. According to this view, when the


































This of course assumes that the strategic objective is to satisfy the need. An important
exception to this routine occurs in, for example, the course of treatment interventions.
Here it is likely that the goal is to interrupt the routine and thus inhibit the
consumatory behaviour. Here the default route is the completion of the sequence
subserved by automatic processes but this can be subject to effortful and strategic
control.
The account does not however speculate on what cognitive operations regulate the
perception and detection of the stimuli and therefore overlooks a potentially crucial
role for selective attention. It nonetheless allows Tiffany (1990) to propose a number
of tests of the model. It is proposed, for instance, that a dual task paradigm where urge
responding is involved and responding to a probe stimulus such as a tone is the
secondary task will generate different outcomes depending on whether the former is
regulated by automatised action schemata or not. If the primary task e.g. exposure to a
drug relevant cue is regulated by relatively automatised processes as in the scenario
where the subject not being impeded in satiation, the secondary task will be less
compromised. Some partial support is forthcoming for this prediction. Sayette, Monti,
Rohsenow et al (1994) demonstrated the disruptive effect of alcohol cues in response
to tone probes. These findings support the notion that cue exposure can have a
disruptive effect on information processing but a fuller test of the moijel would
involve the manipulation of the drug using status of the subjects by creating a
condition where individuals with unimpeded access to their drug of choice would
participate in a dual task procedure, as indeed suggested by Tiffany (1990, p 160).
Another proposed test of particular relevance in the present context is derived from
the proposed automatisation of drug acquisition that is a core component of Tiffany's
model. This, according to Tiffany (1990, p.162), suggests that indices of
automatisation should be related strongly to the amount of usage or consumption (or
practice in skill acquisition terms) that the user has had with their drug of choice.
On an anecdotal level, it is clear from the author's own clinical experience that
individuals with addictive behaviour disorders frequently present as preoccupied with
their drug of abuse and its environmental and cultural contexts. The present
investigation was in part stimulated by the observation in a therapeutic group that a
problem drinker became distracted from one task (reporting on the previous week's
activities) when another client referred in passing to a previous alcoholic "binge". One
possible interpretation of this disruption of the processing of the task in hand was to
attribute a salience to the term "binge" that leads to preferential and relatively
automatised processing.
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Returning to the parallels in accounting for anxiety disorders, it is worth considering
the level and specificity of advice that the putative client would receive. Here it would
be possible to deliver a coherent account of the configuration of cognitive processes
involved in the persistence of the disorder. Eysenck (1992, p. 160), for example,
outlines a necessarily incomplete but nonetheless coherent list of the cognitive effects
in generalised anxiety disorders, panic disorders and post-traumatic stress disorders.
An account of this nature would include reference to the fulcral role played by
attentional processes and selectivity in maintaining a cycle of threat orientated
thoughts, behaviour and affect. An attempt to provide an account of similar scope to
an addicted individual is not possible given the present state of knowledge. In
focusing on the role of attentional processes in addiction, the present proposed
investigation aims to provide empirical evidence relevant to both theoretical accounts
of addiction and the implied psychotherapeutic response. This is essentially the
rationale of the present study.
MODELS OF ATTENTION
The regulatory function of attentional processes in the context of the control of action
was specified in more detail by Norman and Shallice (1980; 1989). They proposed a
higher level of control they referred to, as "The Supervisory System" was necessary to
deal with situations involving:
1 Planning or decision-making.
2 Error correction or "trouble-shooting".
3 Novel sequence of actions.
4 Dangerous or technically difficult.
5 Overcoming a strong habitual response or the resisting of temptations.
(Shallice and Burgess, 1993 p 174).
A problem with specifying categories is that all of the above situations can also be
viewed as dimensional: a situation can be relatively novel, dangerous or tempting.
This means that theoretical accounts need to specify the relative contribution of
strategic and automatic processes make to the completion of a given task or the
production of a particular response. As Wells & Matthews (1994) point out in their
review (p36) failure to function appropriately could be due to either a very strong over
learnt automatic response or a particularly weak degree of strategic control. This
places the above categories proposed by Shallice and Burgess (1993) in context. In
terms of situations involving planning, for instance, it is quite conceivable that
planned operations can be influenced by earlier acquired, overlearned responses. In
relation to the present investigation this issue is significant: individuals apply much
planning in their efforts to overcome addiction or behaviour where control is impaired
but the evidence points to the high level of failure in maintaining such change.
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Looking at the clinical literature, a relationship between indices of cognitive
responding and outcomes is beginning to emerge. Monti and co-workers (Monti,
Abrahms, Kadden et al 1990) have found that response latency to alcohol refusal
scenarios was predictive of outcome. Those evidencing differential longer latencies in
generating a verbal account of an appropriate coping response to alcohol specific
scenarios had poorer outcomes on follow-up. This implies that those who are
relatively more challenged in generating an effortful response are more vulnerable to
relapse, and not just because of general problem solving deficits. Placing this in a
broader clinical context, Lindstrom (1992, p 30) concluded, that using the criterion of
improved drinking behaviour, controlled studies have " generally demonstrated only
weak and short-term effects of alcoholism treatment " (italics in original). In more
quantitative terms this equates to about 15% of individuals sustaining abstinence from
alcohol for three or more consecutive years 5-8 years following treatment (Helzer et
al, 1985). If a more lenient criterion for relapse is used (less than say 10 problem
drinking days) about 25% of problem drinkers can be classed as "unrelapsed"(Orford,
Oppenheimer & Edwards, 1976). In general, evidence of the difficulty in maintaining
changes is consistent with the proposition put forward by Wells & Matthews (1994)
regarding the often unequal contest between over-learnt automatic processes and
weaker strategic "supervisory" control. Shallice and Burgess (1993) use "overcoming
temptation " (point 5 above) as an example of a situation where strategic or
supervisory control needs to be deployed for effective coping to take place. Failure to
cope would, according to this model, be linked to the executive or supervisory system
not interrupting the activation of lower level (ie-automatic) schemas or routines.
Reason (1979) has surveyed the prevalence of these cognitive failures or "action slips"
an example of which is searching for an item only to discover that it is in one's hand.
Importantly, Reason (1993) demonstrated an increase in the reported frequency of
these failures in stressful situations which he links to maladaptive resource
management by vulnerable individuals. The relevant point here is that a cognitive
variable, in this case a resource-intensive, relatively inflexible problem-solving
strategy was apparently associated with raised levels of distress in response to
stressful life events. In necessarily tentative terms, this is analogous to a post-
treatment alcoholic finding a drink in his hand when pre-occupied with a stressful
situation which diverts resources from strategic control of relatively automatised
routines. This brief re-allocation of resources is enough to enable the latter to attain
momentary primacy in regulating behaviour. Given the nature of drug-taking, this
lapse can set the scene for a more prolonged phase of resumed drug use.
A significant feature of Tiffany's theory outlined above is the circumscribed role
attributed to craving in the initiation or resumption of drug use. Tiffany (1992),
maintained that craving is evoked only when the automatic drug acquisition routine is
disrupted. In other words the behaviour will continue with little or no awareness or
intentionality until it becomes apparent that the sought after substance is not available,
at which point the individual becomes aware of craving. This cycle is triggered by
stimulus configurations associated with drug use. The information processing cycle
depicted in the model begins at this stage without acknowledging the role of any pre-
attentional or selective biases. It therefore implicitly points to a response bias process
at work with the individual apparently not altering his or her processing priorities.
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The present investigation is a further attempt to relate an aspect of cognitive
functioning in this case an indicator of attentional bias, to clinical parameters and
outcomes of addictive behaviour disorders. From the standpoint of experimental
psychology, attention has a rich provenance. Described in a recent review as " one of
the central concerns of experimental psychology since its inception " (Cohen et al,
1990, p.332) these authors quote James (1890), who regarded attention as an
essentially selective process and Posner (1975) who emphasised the arousing function
of attention which again implies a preferential component to the process. These
differences of emphasis have implications for psychological processes in general and
addictive behaviour in particular. Regarding the latter, selectivity, in terms of salience
of drug acquisitive behaviours, and arousal, in terms of cue conditioned states such as
craving both are important.
In terms of a levels of control model (Shallice & Burgess, 1993) the aim (or at least
the mechanism) of cognitive-behavioural therapy is to increase the control of the
Supervisory system by increasing the probability of its effective deployment in an
effort to control behavioural routines susceptible to relatively automatised regulation.
A levels of control model based on a continuum of automaticity has particular
advantages as a integrative framework for the purposes of the present study. This is
partly because it allows rival conceptual models space within which to co-exist, with
connectionist models showing promise in dealing with automatic processes (e.g.
Cohen et al, 1990) but more traditional capacity and selection models remaining
relevant for controlled or strategic processes (see Wells & Matthews, 1993 for a
detailed review). As a heuristic position this is acceptable but serves to highlight the
need for a more integrative account of a dual processing approach to cognition.
THE MODIFIED STROOP AND EMOTIONAL DISORDERS
Attention to emotionally significant stimuli has been the focus of recent investigation
in a range of disorders where emotional or behavioural dysregulation is in evidence.
Experimenters have applied a range of techniques and procedures to measure aspects
of attentional allocation and deployment. Among the most widely used methods to
assess attentional bias has been the modified Stroop procedure. It is based on the
original task devised by Stroop (1935) which presented subjects with the inherently
ambiguous task of naming the colour of the ink that a word is printed in which is at
variance with the colour denoted by the word. The resulting interference led to
significantly delayed colour naming compared to performance on a congruent version
of the task. Experimenters subsequently demonstrated that this phenomenon was
generalisable to words other than colour names. Klein (1964) found that colour
naming latency was possible with most common words but particularly associated
with terms such as "grass" semantically linked to colours. More recently the Stroop
procedure has been used variously as an index of distractibility, interference or
general emotional salience. Until the processes subserving the colour naming delay
are better understood, interpretation of Stroop interference will remain inconclusive.
There exists however a significant body of findings implicating Stroop interference in
a range of clinical emotional disorders which will now be addressed.
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Anxiety Disorders
Content specific colour naming latency has been demonstrated in a wide range of
clinical disorders where anxiety and sensitivity to threat are involved. These include
generalised anxiety disorders e.g. Mathews & MacLeod,(1985); post-traumatic stress
disorder ( e.g. Cassiday, McNally & Zeitlin,1992), social phobias ( e.g. Mattia,
Heimberg & Hope, 1993), panic disorder ( e.g. McNally, Riemann & Kim, 1990) and
obsessive-compulsive disorder (e.g. Foa, Ilai et al,1993). Furthermore it has been
demonstrated that psychotherapeutic interventions impact on colour naming latency
(Watts, McKenna, Sharrock, & Trezise, 1986), implying that the assumed attentional
bias is implicated in therapeutic change. Moreover, evidence of delayed colour
naming among high-trait anxious normals has been demonstrated (Mogg & Marden,
1990; Broadbent & Broadbent, 1988).
Typically then a Stroop investigation would involve the presentation of words related
to fears or phobias and neutral words to a clinic sample and normal controls. The
prediction generally was that a differential colour naming latency specific to the clinic
sample and emotive words would occur. This has in fact been the case with all
categories of anxiety disorder in a display of consistency unusual in cognitive
processing research. Noteworthy also is the specificity of the colour naming
impairment observed. In a well controlled study, Foa et al (1993) demonstrated that
clients diagnosed with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) evidenced colour
naming latencies specifically relevant to their concerns. Those with contamination
related obsessions linked to washing rituals were slower to colour-name words like
germs or toilet compared to neutral words. The OCD clients with non-contamination
symptomatology did not show this delay but did display longer latencies with general
threat words such as cancer. Less conclusive findings were apparent regarding a
priming manipulation and predicted relationships between clinical severity and
interference were not observed. The primary finding showing the content specificity
of Stroop interference is significant however particularly when it is recalled that, in
addition to normals, the comparison group comprised OCD individuals manifesting
different features of the same syndrome.
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorders
Evidence also points to the emotional Stroop effect being more marked with clinic
populations than with community samples with experiences or features in common.
Cassiday, McNally and Zeitlin (1992) reported that rape victims with PTSD
performed more slowly on a trauma relevant Stroop task compared to non-PTSD
diagnosed victims, who in turn performed more slowly than non-traumatised controls.
Stroop interference was also statistically related to a self-report measure of intrusive
cognition. This study was replicated and extended by McNally, English & Lipke,
(1993) with a group of 24 Vietnam War veterans. These PTSD diagnosed men colour-
named different categories of words as follows: control, neutral, positive emotional,
OCD and relevant combat terms such as bodybag presumed to reflect combat related
PTSD. The predicted Stroop effect was demonstrated solely with the PTSD terms. A
number of methodological shortcomings were apparent in this study. Firstly, fatigue
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may have been a factor as the Stroop procedure was presented in the same order for
each S, with the PTSD stimuli always coming as the fifth and final trial. Secondly,
the PTSD terms may well have been high frequency in the lexicon of the participants,
thus confounding the attempts made to match the frequency of the terms to neutral
words. The absence of a control group adds to these criticisms. McNally et al (1993)
did however report a test - re-test reliability coefficient (r=.80, p < .001) having re-
administered the Stroop procedure one week later. Considerably more modest and
insignificant correlations were reported between standard self- report measures,
clinicians ratings of severity and Stroop interference respectively.
One of the best controlled studies of PTSD using the modified Stroop was conducted
by Thrasher, Dalgleish and Yule (1994). These researchers recruited survivors from
the Zeebrugge ferry disaster and divided them into high and low PTSD categories. In
addition to the clinical relevance of this manipulation, it enabled the researchers to
control for "expertise" in colour naming disaster-related terms on the assumption that
all survivors were comparable on this dimension by virtue of their shared traumatic
experience. Neutral control words were selected from a homogenous semantic
category as well as a set of unrelated terms. These two manipulations enabled the
researchers to subsequently refute explanations of emotional Stroop interference
attributed to familiarity with the emotionally salient words or semantic priming due to
their homogeneity. This added to the robustness of the findings that high PTSD Ss
evidenced marked interference on disaster words compared to low-PTSD Ss and non-
traumatised controls. The authors concluded that the results provided evidence of a
selective processing bias for the disaster-specific material compared to general threat,
neutral or positive terms.
The fact that this latency differentiated high-PTSD from low-PTSD and controls five
years after the trauma is of considerable theoretical and clinical import. The design
does not, however, allow for a definitive explanation of the findings beyond the
demonstration of clinically related processing bias. According to Thrasher et al, a
failure to emotionally process traumatic experiences might be influential in slowing
colour naming because evoked fear memories could disrupt the inhibition of the word
reading impulse. Alternatively, chronic emotional disturbance could lead to biased
processing of specific threat-related information which in turn disrupts more adaptive
cognitive processing.
Eating Disorders
Beginning with the report of Channon, Hemsley & de Silva (1988) there is now a
growing literature on cognitive processing by eating disordered individuals. The
Stroop paradigm has again proved to be the most commonly used approach. Generally
using food, diet and body-shape words a number of researchers have demonstrated
colour naming delay linked to word content and clinical status or concerns of the
participants (e.g. Ben-Tovim, Walker, Fok & Yap, 1989; Ben-Tovim & Walker, 1991;
Fairburn, Cooper, Cooper, McKenna & Anastasiades, 1991). Colour naming
decrements were not found to be confined to eating disordered individuals (Walker,
Ben-Tovim, Jones & Bachok, 1992) but were also observed with normals displaying
dietary restraint. In general however clinic samples could be distinguished from
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normals due to their slower performance with salient words (Fairburn et al, 1991;
Green & McKenna, 1993).
Taken as a whole, these data have been interpreted in a manner analogous to parallel
findings in anxiety disorders i.e. indicative of a selective attentional bias linked to
preferential processing of concern related terms. Impairments in colour -naming have
been demonstrated with both primarily anorexic Ss (e.g. Channon et al, 1988) and
amongst bulimic Ss (e.g. Fairburn et al, 1991). Clinically, it has been suggested that
this selective tendency is involved in the maintenance of the disorder and can also be
used as a quantitative measure of severity (Ben-Tovim et al, 1989). Walker, Ben-
Tovim & Jones (1992) examined the repeat administration of the emotional Stroop
with a sample of non-eating disordered women (n=60) and found only marginal mean
differences between trials and across parallel versions. They did not report more
conventional reliability data however and questions remain about the generalisability
of the findings to clinical populations.
Summary
In summary it seems that Stroop interference is a robust, demonstrable phenomenon
across a spectrum of emotional disorders, particularly, but not exclusively, where
anxiety is involved. The semantic content of stimulus words does appear to impact on
colour-naming times to a significant degree of specificity congruent with the
presenting problems of the generally clinical populations studied. As will be seen in
the next section however interpreting these findings is a less straightforward business.
THEORETICAL ASPECTS
As described above the modified Stroop research paradigm has been applied by
researchers in a range of areas, generally where threat or anxiety is a component.
Attentional bias implies selectivity and specificity in the detection of salient
environmental events (including interoceptive feedback) and the differential
resourcing of subsequent cognitive processing. Williams and co-workers (1988, p. 54)
assume that attentional bias occurs when:
" there is a discrete change in the direction in which a person's attention is
focused so that he/she becomes aware of a particular part or aspect of his/her
stimulus environment. We also assume that such a change (a) may take place in any
sense modality; (b) is perceived as being passive or involuntary but can operate
voluntarily; and (c) is normally perceived to be contingent upon a discrete change
(onset or offset) in the 'internal' or 'external' environment ofthe person."
These theorists further assumed that the decision to bias attention took place at an
early stage i.e. pre-attentively and, more specifically, was independent of response
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bias (p67). Thus, high trait or state anxious subjects are predicted to display a bias
towards attending to stimulus events rated as high in threat value by a process of
affective decision making. While acknowledging the value of the theoretical model,
Eysenck (1992) commented on some of its omissions and limitations. Of relevance in
the present context is the failure of Williams et al (1988) to deal with other relevant
phenomena such as attentional scanning, breadth of attention and distractibility. For
Eysenck (1992), these processes can be viewed collectively as a latent cognitive
vulnerability factor that is termed hypervigilance. This is presumed to manifest itself
in situations where threat is apparent to individuals with generalised anxiety disorder
and high trait anxious normals. Typically they will display increased attentional
scanning, more focused attention on detection of threat and generally higher levels of
distractibility. These cognitive processes, operating rapidly and generally without
strategic control, are involved in the maintenance of anxiety related disorders. By
proposing latency in the hypervigilant tendency this model generates predictions
about altered attentional processing in those who have recovered from anxiety
disorders. Both hypervigilance and information processing models however propose
that fear-relevant information is prioritised at an early stage for processing, implying
an attentional bias. As will be seen however, the extent to which the modified Stroop
reflects, solely or even partially, an acquired attentional bias is the subject of some
debate.
Interpreting the Modified Stroop
The attentional bias interpretation has been challenged by some researchers, generally
pointing out that colour naming latency could be a result of additional processes such
as cognitive avoidance (De Ruiter & Brosschot, 1994); or a more specific response
bias associated with familiarity or "expertise" (Matthews & Klug, 1993). De Ruiter &
Brosschot (1994) point to the colour naming delay associated with positively valenced
words as evidence of a tendency to cognitively avoid affective material in general
rather than more specific schema congruent delay linked to negatively valenced
words. It seems equally plausible that the positive words are in effect strongly
semantically linked with their opposites e.g." happiness-sadness" and are therefore
likely to disrupt colour naming possibly in a graded manner. These authors also point
to the longer colour naming latencies observed with subjects with "repressor"
characteristics, citing Weinberger, Schartz & Davidson (1979).
The status of the repression-sensitisation concept has been questioned by Eysenck
(1992) who concluded that in essence it measured trait anxiety which means that those
scoring high on the repressor scale evidenced more colour naming latency because
they were more anxious. Dawkins & Furnham (1989) used a modified Stroop
procedure with repressors, high trait anxiety Ss and low trait anxiety Ss. They found
that colour naming latency for threat words clearly distinguished between low anxiety
Ss and repressors but the difference between this group and the high trait anxious Ss
was less pronounced. This is consistent with the notion that repressors are in effect
dispositional^ more anxious and hardly surprising given the evidence that anxious
normals will take longer to colour name threatening words. It is less clear why
repressors score low on measures of trait anxiety, if they are in reality simply trait
anxious, apart from invoking the circular reasoning that they do so because they are
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repressors. In more general terms, from an experimental cognitive perspective their is
an issue of admissibility of evidence in this case: Using data gathered by self-report
with its attendant biases is questionable when the problem is accounting for a more
precisely specified cognitive process such as attentional bias or, as the case may be,
cognitive avoidance. A more recent account of the role of self-reports in anxiety
(Eysenck,1997) has emphasised the degree to which self-reports can be systematically
biased in either direction ( i.e. repression or verbal report of distress) resulting in
discordance between subjective, behavioural and physiological indices of arousal. As
these attentional and interpretative processes are not generally available to
introspection they can confound attempts at classification or categorical diagnosis
when the latter is based exclusively on self-report. This has important implications for
both research and clinical diagnostic practice which often rely almost exclusively on
self- report. It does not mean that such a key source of information should be ignored,
but that where possible corroboration should be sought.
The major empirical stumbling block in accounting for the modified Stroop
phenomena, and thus informing the attentional bias versus response bias debate is the
difficulty in devising a task that cannot be influenced by strategic processes and thus
prone to response biasing. As MacLeod (1991) concluded in his review, post-
encoding processing was influential in accounting for some experimental findings e.g.
the increased interference associated with mixing congruent colour-naming with
incongruent trials due presumably to strategic switching of attention. Glaser & Glaser
(1982) went some way towards specifying the temporal location of Stroop
interference in a series of five experiments in which they manipulated the temporal
relationship between the presentation of the colour and word components of Stroop
stimuli. They demonstrated that pre-exposure of word or colour patches up to 400
msecs prior to the other component (i.e.colour or word stimulus respectively) did not
impact on reading but strongly inhibited colour naming when the stimulus onset
asynchrony (SOA) procedure used incongruent colours. They concluded that these
data were inconsistent with a relative speed of processing account of Stroop
interference which would predict the temporal advantage of advance colour
presentation would cancel out the facilitation inherent in reading. Conceptually this
has important implications, pointing to Stroop interference being located early in the
information processing cycle and therefore not solely or even predominantly reflective
of response bias.
Returning to the modified Stroop, of relevance also is the finding that Stroop response
latency is not necessarily linear in proportion to the threat value of the stimulus:
contrary to predictions, Mathews & Sebastion (1993) found a facilitation of colour
naming when snake phobic subjects were required to perform in the presence of a real
snake. Their subjects were not drawn from a clinic population however, which raises
questions about the interpretation of these findings. Moreover, as was seen above,
Stroop interference has been reported with diverse client groups such as those with
eating disorders where the emotional valence is more ambiguous and hence a motive
for avoidance is less clear.
Phenomonenologically at least, the experience of people afflicted by chronic anxiety
is that, far from avoiding emotional memories and other cognitions, their intrusive
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nature makes them unwelcome as does their resistance to voluntary dismissal or
distraction. The possibility that these cognitions are generally subject to attenuated
cognitive processing has been explored as an explanation of colour naming delay with
PTSD Ss. This is proposed as an explanation of the apparent paradox between the
existence of cognitive avoidance in the face of what is often preoccupation with the
source of threat. Thrasher et al (1994), for instance, speculated that the increased
colour naming delay in more symptomatic Ss could be due to the increased effort
required to inhibit the reading response in the face of re-activated traumatic memories.
This contrasts with the reaction of the less affected PTSD Ss who had presumably
processed the traumatic memories more completely, thus reducing their potential for
distraction.
Even if the modified Stroop had never been devised, accounting for the large and
growing literature on the original, colour-conflict Stroop has proved a challenge to
psychological theorists. Given the scope of the empirical database however more
integrative reviews have been published. In the most recent, comprehensive, review,
MacLeod (1991) attempted to integrate the findings of over 700 studies of the Stroop
effect then available. MacLeod (1991) found the conceptually close speed of
processing and automaticity accounts of the Stroop phenomenon wanting in the light
of empirical findings and endorsed a parallel distributed processing (PDP) theoretical
account described by Cohen et al (1990) as a framework for future research. As the
modified Stroop has not yet faced the empirical challenge reviewed by MacLeod
(1991), the degree to which it fits into a PDP framework remains unclear. Further, the
extent to which it reflects response competition, assumed to be influential in the
original Stroop, is open to question (see Eysenck, 1992, p64). Both versions of the
Stroop appear to measure interference with one task (colour naming) by another (the
words that are 'colour-named') whether these are incongruent colourwise or
emotionally valenced. In both versions the over learned tendency to read words
competes with the experimental instructional set. In the modified Stroop, this
interference is assumed to reflect the threat value or degree of activation of cognitive
structures associated with emotionality.
In their paper quoted above, Cohen et al (1990) proposed a model based on the
principles of parallel distributed processing (PDP) which proposes that both speed of
processing and interference are related to an underlying variable labelled strength of
processing. This construct, these authors propose, can account for three attributes of
automaticity: practice effects, response competition and attentional regulation. In
terms of Stroop interference, the higher levels of speed and accuracy normally
apparent on the reading task lead to suppressed performance with the colour naming
task because both tasks share common, differentially activated, pathways which
interact. The definitive feature of the PDP model is therefore its accounting of
attention which is modelled as a modulator of processing in the hypothetical network
pathways. This is achieved through alteration of the responsiveness of the units
implicated in responding to task demands (e.g. "respond to colour" or "respond to
word") and thus the resulting pattern of interference or facilitation characteristic of the
colour-conflict Stroop. The implication here is that all processing in the network is
affected by attention to some degree as evidenced by the interference caused by word
reading, a task definitively automatic or "direct". A corollary to this is that there is a
continuum of automaticity. ( see Fig. 2 )
21
PDP Model ofStnoop Interference




Figure 2 A Parallel Distributed Processing model ofStroop Interference ( Cohen et
al 1990))
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The notion of an attribute such as strength of processing that is continuous and
sensitive to environmental events such as the number of practice trials provides a
convenient stepping stone to the clinical domain. The fact that a wide spectrum of
psychological disorders are characterised by repetition and persistence of problematic
thoughts, behaviours and emotions raises the possibility that strength of processing is
an important feature of these syndromes. A particularly apt example is that of
addictive behaviour, which in connectionist terms could be viewed as regulated by
cognitive processes relatively high in strength due to repeated activation of pathways.
In the absence of consensus in accounting for the processes mediating the emotional
Stroop effect, it can nonetheless be concluded that there is evidence of the disruptive
influence of emotionally valenced words on colour naming. The evidence suggests
that this is reflective of the emotional and personal concerns of the individual in a
specific and probably quantifiable manner. Applying Cohen et al's (1990) account to
the emotional Stroop, the key point is that the processing that occurs under
significantly reduced attention, is enough to delay, but not dominant enough to
subvert, the colour-naming task demand. Moving to the clinical arena, Stroop latency
has been found to relate meaningfully to other indices of distress or dysfunction, and,
more tentatively, to therapeutic gain. The fact that the colour naming task does not
require introspection or self -report, with their attendant pitfalls, adds to the potential
of the modified Stroop paradigm as a means of charting the cognitive substrate of
emotional disorder.
IMPLICATIONS FOR ADDICTIVE BEHAVIOUR
In accounting for addictive behaviour theoretical models derived from classical
conditioning theory and social learning theory represent established conceptual
frameworks with strong empirical bases. As will become clear however these
approaches have not generally guided researchers towards cognitivist models. Both
behaviourist and cognitivist traditions have sought to account for cue exposure and
cue reactivity according to their own imperatives but both implicitly regard the cue as
a "given". The most comprehensive published account of cognitive processing in drug
urge and drug-use behaviour is provided by Tiffany (1990,1992) and discussed above.
As will be recalled, he outlined a dual processing framework, which described the
drug acquisition and consumption procedures as automatised in the following terms:
"stereotyped, stimulus-bound, effortless, difficult to control and not dependent on
awareness for completion" (Tiffany, 1992 p. 132.) Tiffany further described how urges
to engage in drug use are generated only when either gratification is denied through
environmental impediments or when conscious, effortful attempts are being made by
an abstinent person to avoid drug use. Conceptually this is at a different level from
much of the foregoing such as PDP models. It is concerned more with the control of
action rather than cognitive processes per se and draws on the work of Norman &
Shallice (1985). These authors specify the overcoming of habitual responses or
resisting temptation as examples of situations where deliberate attentional processing
is essential, thus supporting the key proposition of Tiffany's model that urge
responding is governed by non-automatic processes.
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This model correctly highlights the role of non-conscious, automatised processing in
the regulation of drug use but perhaps at the cost of minimising the role of
consciously planned routines. The implicit assumption seems to be that drug
acquisition is, in the cognitive processing sense, effortless (in Tiffany's example the
alcoholic only has to deploy non-automatic processes when it emerges that the
refrigerator is bereft of alcohol because drug seeking is regulated by automatised
processes). The environment is rarely so munificent to drug users however and often
requires a high degree of cognitive effort before gratification is forthcoming. The
point at issue here is the extent to which automatic routines are influential in the cycle
of drug acquisition and consumption. As Jacoby et al (1993) point out, consciously
controlled processes set the context for such automatised processes but essentially
automaticity is an "emergent property" of the execution of particular skilled
behaviours in an environment rather than being purely stimulus bound. In support of
this Jacoby et al (1993) report some of their efforts at developing experimental
procedures for dissociating the relative contribution of automatic and strategic
processing in cognitive tasks such as memory. This process-dissociation paradigm has
not been applied to research in the emotional disorders but evidence points towards a
fluctuating contribution of automaticity in memory. Jacoby, Woloshyn and Kelley
(1989) demonstrated this variability by means of a divided attention procedure. When
subjects were distracted by a competing task more errors due to automatic processing
were made.
It could be argued that insofar as the modified Stroop procedure provides an example
of divided attention it dissociates the strategic from the automatic processes although
the experimenters do not control the allocation of attentional resources as directly as
in the process dissociation paradigm (Jacoby et al, 1993). Nonetheless, from this
perspective, colour-naming latency is at least an index of attentional resource
allocation and as such should reflect the relative contribution of task irrelevant
automatic processing to the performance. The most important characteristic frequently
attributed to automatic processing is the degree of voluntary control exercised. In the
modified Stroop paradigm the delay with emotionally valenced words is consistent
with involuntary processing as subjects appear compromised in their ability to
perform the colour-naming task when specifically relevant word stimuli are featured.
Generalising this to real person-environment interactions justifies the emphasis
Tiffany (1992) placed on the role of automatic cognitive processes. The possibility
that, at critical junctures in the process of changing patterns of addictive behaviour,
regulation might be governed by stimulus-bound, stereotyped, rapid processes
occurring outside awareness is of considerable theoretical and clinical import. This
comes close to one of the other key attributes of automaticity that Norman & Shallice
(1986) specify, namely the "attention-demanding" feature of the stimulus.
To conclude, viewed in this more circumscribed, operationally defined context, the
modified Stroop is an appropriate research tool with which to probe automaticity.
The broader question of whether automaticity is conceived of as a fully independent
regulatory system operating for the most part outside conscious control or is more
context bound with the parameters set by conscious operations is a question yet to be
fully addressed empirically and lies beyond the scope of the present study and the
limitations inherent in the modified Stroop paradigm.
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EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The most direct empirical evidence of selective processing of information takes place
in the context of addictive behaviour comes from the research of Gross, Jarvik &
Rosenblatt (1993). These investigators recruited 20 smokers and randomly assigned
them to either nicotine abstinence or continued normal smoking for a period of 12
hours. They found that, as predicted, abstinent smokers (N=10) showed significant
colour-naming latency on a card-format Stroop procedure consisting of smoking
related and frequency-matched neutral words. In contrast, the non-abstinent group
(N=10), who had presumably carried on smoking at their normal rate, showed the
reverse effect i.e. faster colour-naming of smoking - relevant words compared to
neutral words matched for frequency. The authors speculated that this could be due to
non-abstinent smokers benefiting from greater processing efficiency when colour-
naming smoking words when compared to neutral words as the former would possess
a greater functional frequency regardless of attempts at frequency matching. The
facilitation is consistent with the operation of rapid, relatively autonomous,
processing. Gross et al (1993) however acknowledge the possibility of problems with
the matching of words across the two stimulus conditions on the basis of population
norms. This led to some apparently incongruous choices in the control word condition
such as "glycerin", "pennant" and "saddlebag" which while presumably correctly
matched for frequency to smoking words seem somewhat arcane.
A potentially more difficult problem with this aspect of the study is the failure to
select a list of neutral words from a semantically homogenous category as the
smoking stimuli were necessarily semantically related. There was therefore a semantic
priming effect with the smoking words but not with the neutral words. This means
that the predicted longer colour-naming latency for smoking related words in the
abstinent condition could have been influenced by the effect of the semantic
homogeneity of these words which made the colour-naming task more difficult.
Abstinent smokers could thus have been more susceptible to interference based on
priming effects than their smoking counterparts. As will be seen in the following
section, abstinent addicts are particularly sensitive to disrupted information
processing. Gross et al have demonstrated this but leave some uncertainty regarding
the extent to which the interference was due to comparing colour-naming of high-
frequency, semantically linked words to that of low- frequency, unrelated words.
Nonetheless, a design that manipulated the drug-using status of Ss and demonstrated
between- subjects effects is noteworthy and worth replicating.
Corroborative, if less direct, evidence comes from studies that assessed the impact of
naturally occurring or experimentally manipulated urges to engage in forms of drug
taking on cognitive efficiency on unrelated tasks such as responding to tone probes or
other reaction time tasks (Droungas et al, 1992; Cepado-Benito & Tiffany, 1994).
Relating this to clinical outcomes, Drummond, Tiffany, Glautier and Remington
(1995) cite a study by Binkoff et al (1984) which found that alcoholics who were
more reactive to alcohol cues manifested more coping skill deficits when exposed to
salient cues than their less reactive counterparts. This might appear somewhat obvious
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depending on how cue reactivity is defined (from a cognitive processing perspective it
could be regarded as attending to task irrelevant stimuli), but nonetheless highlights
the potential sensitivity of post-treatment alcoholics to salient cues. This disruption in
cognitive processing is also consistent with the clinical anecdote described above.
However, it should be recalled that almost a third of clinic alcoholics in some studies
failed to display any reportable subjective or measurable physiological response to
relevant cues. In the absence of a direct measure of attentional focus, apart from the
somewhat circular that those who responded attended to the cue and that those who
failed to respond did not, the inconsistent research findings hypothetically implicate a
cognitively mediated differential response.
Another source of variability that needs to be taken into account is habituation, which
in the context of the emotional Stroop can be reflected in faster colour naming times
either across trial blocks (within session) or over longer periods (between session)
when therapeutic intervention, for instance, is involved. Green, McKenna and De
Silva (1994) pointed out that while some evidence exists on the sensitivity of Stroop
interference in response to treatment ( e.g. Watts et al 1986), very few researchers
have measured intra-session habituation to Stroop interference. In their own
investigation Green et al (1994) found evidence of speeding up of colour naming
times for body-shape words compared to food related words and neutral words. This
was interpreted as an indication of the relatively robust nature of the attentional shift
towards food related words and was regarded as consistent with observations and self-
reports pointing to the pre-occupation with food that eating disordered individuals
display. The available literature in the addictive behaviour field does not allow for
such specific predictions to be made. In the absence of any evidence of Stroop
interference with any alcohol related words it therefore appears premature to speculate
on the durability of any putative effect. A starting point however is to assume a
habituation effect which has been defined as " the decline in response to a repeatedly
presented stimulus" (Mackintosh, 1987).
THE PRESENT STUDY
At the inception of the present study only one investigation using Stroop methodology
in addictions was available (Gross et al, 1992). In the absence of a significant body of
empirical findings the predictions tested in the present study are necessarily
exploratory and inferential. The lack of empirical data on the role of cognitive
processes in addiction and cue exposure research discussed above is therefore also
apparent in the literature on social learning theory applications. Theorists have
nonetheless invoked cognitive factors such as efficacy and outcome expectancies in
their efforts to account for the modification of addictive behaviour. As discussed
earlier in this text, these efforts have focused explicitly on strategic or controlled
processes such as planning ahead and learning new coping or problem solving
strategies. Marlatt (1985) for example uses the metaphor of a motorist to represent the
post-treatment progress of the addict. He proposed that "high risk situations" (i.e. for
re-occurrence of the voluntarily proscribed addictive behaviour) could be represented
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metaphorically as a car journey with all of the attendant hazards such as hairpin
bends. The dangers are however preceded by warning signs and the goal of therapy is
to teach the client to identify these with the aim of employing the appropriate coping
responses. The worthy therapeutic goals of increased vigilance and enhanced coping
imply, and indeed rely on , changes in cognitive processing . As a review of the
outcome research will testify, this process of anticipation and timely coping is
occasionally or probably frequently unsuccessful (Lindstrom, 1992). Further, the task
of detecting and allocating processing resources to stimuli predictive of either
metaphorical or real hazards in the context of relapse prevention has not been directly
investigated to date. A starting point is to directly investigate aspects of selective
cognitive processing of individuals with clinically significant substance misuse
problems including dependency. This is in essence the rationale of the present
investigation.
In the present study, a modified Stroop procedure was devised to address a twofold
research problem: The first concerns itself with the question of whether the
performance of a clinic sample of problem drinkers is distinguishable from non-
patient controls; the second focuses on the relationship between Stroop performance
and indices of alcohol consumption and alcohol problems. More general factors such
as "caseness" (Martin ,Williams & Clark, 1991) might also be involved. Essentially,
these researchers found that Stroop interference did not discriminate between groups
of normals displaying different levels of trait anxiety. Eysenck (1992) concluded in
his review that there was nonetheless convincing evidence that high trait anxious
normals were susceptible to Stroop interference with threatening stimuli. Given the
lack of similar studies with addicted populations, the predictions in the present study
are based on conceptualisations of automaticity such as those discussed above (ppl9-
20). Regarding subject selection it was clear that the clinic sample required would
need to be drawn from a population with manifest alcohol problems but currently
abstinent and actively engaged in resisting any reversal of this state of sobriety. Apart
from eliminating the disruptive effects of current or very recent heavy drinking on
information processing, a dependent measure in the study, ensuring abstinence
allowed for an information-processing framework to be applied. Specifically, by
looking at a cohort of Ss that were, in the words of Norman & Shallice (1985,p2.),
attempting to overcome a "strong habitual response or resisting temptation" provides a
context in which competition between controlled and automatic processing is likely to
be accentuated and thus reflected in Stroop interference with salient stimuli.
The control group was selected with a view to matching the experimental group for
frequency of usage and familiarity with the word stimuli used in the Stroop task (see
below). More conventional control procedures such as word frequency matching were
not employed due to the assumed high frequency of usage of the alcohol-related terms
in both groups. The rationale for this decision was to provide the most stringent test of
a processing bias implicated in alcohol addiction while prioritising attempts at
controlling for familiarity or frequency effects, attributes assumed to impact on the
output of the control Ss also. Put simply, this enabled observed differences in colour
naming between the groups to be attributed more confidently to clinical status once
general cognitive impairment due to alcohol ingestion or other factors had been
accounted for. Inevitably, matching on this criterion compromised efforts to equate
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the two groups on other important dimensions such as age. Another important issue is
the fact that the control group was likely to be regular or occasional consumers of
alcohol, in keeping with general population norms. In relation to this characteristic it
should be borne in mind that the predicted differences in Stroop performance across
groups described next were predicated on disordered alcohol use rather than regular
consumption per se. The extent to which such drinking behaviour was habitual and
hence relatively automatised provided a conceptual basis for hypotheses regarding the
relationship between indices of this behaviour and the relatively automatised
diversion of cognitive processing resources characteristic of the modified Stroop
procedure.
HYPOTHESES
It is firstly hypothesised that the alcoholic cohort will display a pattern of
performance on a modified Stroop test consistent with a preferential processing bias
towards words related to alcohol misuse compared to neutral words. This is derived
from the substantial body of evidence pointing to the existence of selective processing
of emotionally salient words among clinic populations, generally indexed by colour
naming latency on modified Stroop procedures.
Secondly it is predicted that significant positive relationships will emerge between the
measure of cognitive processing on the one hand and indices of severity of alcohol
dependence and parameters of alcohol consumption on the other. This is predicated
on the habitual, repetitive nature of addictive behaviours and the assumption that these
will be regulated by relatively automatised cognitive processes and thus sensitive to
Stroop interference. These processes have been conceptualised as strength of
processing (Cohen et al, 1990, see pp 19-20 above). Tiffany (1990, p. 162) predicted
that indices of automatisation should be strongly related to the extent of practice or
chronicity apparent in the drug history. Insofar as controls will also have engaged in
recent and possibly regular alcohol consumption it is assumed that the relationship
between the index of cognitive processing and aspects of drinking behaviour will still
hold although to a lesser degree. This reflects a conceptual view of alcohol use that is
dimensional rather than categorical.
Thirdly it is hypothesised that habituation, as reflected in speeding up of colour
naming across the two trials, will be significantly greater with the clinic sample with
respect to the clinically relevant words and compared to the performance of controls.
This prediction is derived from the results of Green et al (1994) who found that their
eating disordered Ss showed different patterns of habituation to food and body shape
words which were interpreted as showing a more robust cognitive processing bias (i.e.
less habituation) towards the former. In the absence of any direct evidence the present
hypothesis is the more conservative one based on the general tendency for individuals





A group of 33 problem drinkers attending a specialist clinic and 32 control healthcare
staff performed a modified Stroop colour naming task using two sets of stimuli
printed on different cards. The Ss were required to colour name alcohol related and
neutral words with response latency designated as the dependent measure. Other
variables relating to alcohol history and emotional functioning were also specified.
Sample
Subjects (Ss) for the experimental (clinic sample) group were recruited in cohorts of
successive attendees to a community based treatment centre for alcohol problems
between July 1994 and August 1995. Controls were recruited between November
1994 and March 1996. Ss were predominantly male with the gender balance
equivalent across groups with four and five female Ss in clinical and control groups
respectively.
The following inclusion criteria were applied for recruitment into the clinic cohort: -
A history of alcohol problems of at least five years duration and/or a diagnosis of
Alcohol Dependence Syndrome (ICD/DSM)
- Scores of at least 31 on the 20-item Severity of Alcohol Dependence Questionnaire
(SADQ). This is the threshold specified by the authors for classifying alcohol
dependence as "severe". (Stockwell, Murphy & Hodgson, 1983).
Exclusion criteria were as follows:
- Indications of alcohol use prior to participation in the study.
- Concurrent use of psychotropic medication or illicit drugs.
- Evidence of gross neuro-cognitive impairment (apart from the general loss of
cognitive efficiency associated with recent alcohol excess and withdrawal from same).
- Evidence of significant mental health problems (apart from the dysphoria and
anxiety associated with withdrawal from alcohol).
- Colour blindness or other significant visual impairment
-Ss for whom English was not their first language.
Control Subjects
These were volunteers recruited from Riverside Substance Misuse Service and were
predominantly from health and social care backgrounds. A subset was recruited from
a diploma course in addictive behaviours. These Ss were also specialising in this area
and worked in direct clinical roles or related settings such as supported housing.
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See Table 1 for a description of relevant variables in the two groups.





Age (years) 43.12(9.49) 36.94(8.35)


















Time elapsed since last
drink (hours)
101.12(169.11) 40.91(774.12)
Standard deviations in brackets
Subjects in the clinic sample were significantly older than those in the control group,
as can be seen from Table 1. Both groups were equivalent in terms of years spent in
full-time education, here assumed to index general intelligence. All Ss scored within
the expected range in keeping with their clinical or control status on measures such as
the HAD and SADQ. Similarly, as can be seen from the data on alcohol consumption,
the groups can be clearly distinguished in terms of quantity of alcohol consumed per
drinking occasion. The clinical cohort can therefore be characterised as significantly
alcohol dependent, anxious and depressed when compared to the control group. The
clinic group also reported a longer period had elapsed since last consuming alcohol
when compared to their counterparts in the control group. This reflected the fact that
Ss in the former group were attempting to abstain. Statistical analyses of the mean
differences are in Appendix I.
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Design
A 2x2 mixed design was employed with clinical status of subject (problem drinker or
control) and word type (alcohol related or neutral) as factors. The dependent measure
was colour-naming latency using a modified Stroop task consisting of words related
to alcohol and alcoholism and neutral, semantically homogenous control words.
Materials
Stimulus Words
The experimental words were selected from a list of terms judged to be frequently
used by clients. This original list was formed by a "brainstorming" procedure
conducted by the experimenter (E) with three colleagues. This exercise generated 22
words (see Appendix II). In the absence of any objective or quantitative means of
selecting words, the list of words to be colour-named was compiled on the basis of
ratings by clinic attendees. These clients (N=10) were asked to rate the terms
according to subjective threat or desirability on a four-point scale. The aim was to
generate terms that would have emotional connotations with the clinic sample, who
were not recruited from these volunteers. The selected words consisted of the
following:
ALCOHOL, ADDICTION, DEPENDENCE, DRUNK, RELAPSE.
The above list were words that were rated as "unpleasant or threatening" (mean rating
1.225) rather than "desirable" (mean rating 0.833), although, as can be seen, there is
some overlap. The mean ratings suggested that the words chosen for inclusion were
emotionally salient in terms of threat value but could also be rated as desirable. Of
note was the general failure to rate names of alcoholic beverages on either dimension.
The final list reflected to some degree inputs from individuals representative of both
clinic and control samples, none of whom participated subsequently.
Control words were selected from a category that was presumed to be semantically
homogenous as follows:
FIREPLACE, CHAIR, BATHROOM, KITCHEN, CUPBOARD.
Apart from selecting terms that were mundane and presumably in common usage
these words were not matched for frequency with the "alcohol" set because this would
have been of questionable validity due to the assumed high frequency of usage of the
latter by the participants. Words were matched for number of letters ("alcohol" words
contained 38 letters and neutral words contained 37). Both groups of words were
printed in colours generated by a suitable computer programme and matched as
closely as possible to RED, GREEN, BLUE and BROWN. The words for each
condition were then printed on cards in letters measuring 4 millimetres by 3
millimetres. Words appeared in a pseudo-random order with the proviso that the same
word or colour did not immediately follow (see Appendix III). Each of the words
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occurred ten times in each condition, assigned to each of the four colours on a random
basis.
The Severity of Alcohol Dependence Questionnaire (S.A.D.Q.). The SADQ
(Stockwell et al 1979) is a 20 item self-administered questionnaire. The original,
slightly longer, version was originally standardised on a sample of 104, predominantly
male, clients at a London clinic specialising in treating addictive disorders. Factor
analysis on data gathered from this sample suggested that one factor accounted for
53% of the total variance. Further analysis pointed to the large and significant
contribution made by physical and affective withdrawal symptoms as well as the
rapidity with which these were reinstated when alcohol was again consumed after
periods of abstinence. The SADQ is routinely administered to RSMS clients.
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) (Zigmund & Snaith, 1983). The
HADS is a 14-item questionnaire which was designed to detect clinically significant
levels of anxiety and depression among general hospital out-patients. It provides
separate measures for both anxiety and depression and an indication of the severity.
The HADS was standardised on a sample of 100 and has acceptable validity. It has the
advantage of brevity and ease of administration and also forms a part of the routine
assessment for RSMS clients.
Sociodemographic Data. These data were gathered through a brief self-administered
questionnaire. Ss were also asked how many years they had spent in formal education,
the response to which was used as a means of comparing groups in terms of
intellectual ability.
Alcohol Consumption Variables. In addition to measuring dependence using the
SADQ, Ss were also interviewed about their patterns of past and more recent alcohol
consumption. The guidelines for this were based on the Quantity-Frequency-
Variability (QFV) index (Cahalan, Cisin & Crossley, 1969). These parameters capture
important features of alcohol consumption and will be independent variables in
subsequent data analyses. Related to this, these indices are quantifiable along a
continuum along which both experimental group Ss and control group Ss can be
placed. This is in contrast to the SADQ score which, in addition to quantifying the
degree of alcohol dependence, has a cut-off point and was also used as a means of
screening Ss. Thus any potential control group volunteer who scored in the clinical
range on the SADQ could be excluded and conversely any recruit for the clinic group
who scored below this would also have been excluded. Neither eventuality occurred.
Procedure
Prior to participation in the test sessions all Ss were presented with a consent form to
read and sign if the subject was prepared to continue (see Appendix IV for this and the
post hoc explanation). This explained that the task would involve identifying colours
and answering a series of other questions on a strictly confidential basis. If it was not
already known, Ss were asked whether (a) they were aware of any colour vision
problems and (b) whether English was their first language. The S was then invited to a
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well- lit consulting room towards the rear of the clinic where all testing subsequently
took place. The session began with the Stroop procedure. Firstly Ss were given a
column of words to colour name from the original Stroop test (Trenberry, Crosson,
DeBoe & Leber, 1989). This was carried out as a practice trial but also allowed the
experimenter (E) to verify the self-reported absence of impairment in colour vision or
other impediments to performing the modified Stroop task. The Modified Stroop test
was administered next with "alcohol" and "neutral" words presented in a counter¬
balanced order. Ss 1-5 completed two trials of the alcohol Stroop and one of the
neutral words. Subsequently, the procedure was modified and the remainder of the Ss
carried out two trials in each condition. This post hoc adaptation of the procedure was
instigated in order to provide a more definitive test of predictions regarding the
relative durability of Stroop interference (hypothesis three relating to habituation)
across conditions in keeping with the factorial design. Thus, in addition to comparing
putative changes in response times to "alcohol" words across groups the additional
trial with neutral words enabled comparisons across conditions to be made within
groups. In all cases half of the sample began with the neutral Stroop and half started
with the alcohol version. Responses were timed using a digital stopwatch. Responses
were also initially recorded on audio tape in order to monitor errors but this was
discontinued after S five as it proved possible to monitor the very low error rate
without any difficulty. Following the completion of the modified Stroop test Ss were
interviewed about aspects of their alcohol consumption and completed the necessary
questionnaires. Finally Ss were given the explanation sheet (Appendix IV) and invited
to ask questions if necessary.
RESULTS
Following the completion of scoring and collation of the various measures the data
were analysed using SPSS for Windows. Means for the dependent measure, colour
naming response time, are shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Mean Colour Naming Latency in Both Conditions and Trials ( Seconds)
Clinic Control
Alcohol
word Trial 1 48.01(13.13) 39.61(7.76)
Trial 2 41.67(10.00) 37.67(7.89)
Neutral
word Trial 1 41.72(11.28) 36.12(8.27)
Trial 2 37.67(8.25) 34.31(7.8)
Standard deviations in brackets
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Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to test the significance of any differences or
interactions among the mean response times. This revealed main effects for Group [F
(1,63)=5.82, P<0.05]; Trial [F (1,64)=39.99, F<0.001]; and Word [F (1,63)=62.29,
P< 0.001]. These analyses were consistent with the trends notable in Table 2,
indicating faster response times for colour naming (i) across both conditions by the
control group, (ii) on the second of the two trials and (iii) colour naming the neutral
words compared to the alcohol words. The hypothesised interaction between Group
and Word failed to reach significance [ F(l,63)= 2.77, P>.05]. These analyses were
completed assuming a full dataset by substituting the relevant mean for the missing
values. As described above, these missing values were for the second trial of the
neutral version of the modified Stroop procedure for Ss 1-5 inclusive. Subsequently,
the ANOVA was repeated without the cases containing the missing values. This
revealed similar findings to the procedure carried using the substitution
procedure[F( 1,5 8)=2.42, P>.05], Both versions of the ANOVA are in Appendix I.
A further consideration relates to the appropriateness of ANOVA procedures given
the differing variances in the dependant measure across groups. Levene's test of
equality of means revealed significant differences in variance for mean colour
naming latency in both conditions across experimental and control groups [ F=6.789,
P<.05 for neutral words; F=6.089, P<.05 for alcohol words, df=63 in both cases].
Taking advice from Howell (1997) however, there are situations where the
assumptions of homogeneity of variance and normality can be relaxed with relatively
little cost to the validity of the procedure. This assumes that the sample sizes are
approximately similar in each group and that the variances do not differ by more than
a factor of four from the smallest to the largest ( Howell, 1997, p.327). The present
data meet these requirements .
In order to describe the performance of each group with respect to word type an
"interference index" was derived by calculating the difference in response times for
each group in each condition (i.e. colour naming alcohol or neutral words). This
compound variable allowed for direct comparison between groups despite the less
efficient cognitive processing by the alcoholic group associated with the deleterious
effects of alcohol excess and their greater age. The mean scores in seconds are shown
in Figure 3
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Clinic Ss Control Ss
Figure 3
Following the example of Williams, Mathews & MacLeod (1996) the mean time
difference was also calculated for each word by dividing the "interference index"
described above by the number of words that were colour named across both trials.
The results indicated that the time difference between colour naming alcohol words
and neutral words for the clinical group was 102 milliseconds compared to 70
milliseconds for the control group. This transformation of the data allows for at least
an approximate comparison to be made with results from other research studies where
procedural differences might otherwise prevent this. The data are consistent with a
trend for the clinic sample to evidence more interference with the alcohol related
words.
Multiple Regression Analyses were conducted to evaluate the relationships
hypothesised between alcohol consumption variables and Stroop performance in
keeping with the hypotheses stating that chronicity and severity of alcohol misuse
would be predictive of increased disruption to colour naming. A series of stepwise
regression equations was calculated using a range of alcohol consumption indices as
independent variables and the derived interference index as the dependent variable.
Variables such as depression, anxiety, group status (experimental or control), age and
education were also included but failed to reach significance and were dropped from
subsequent analyses. The independent variables that were most predictive of alcohol-
specific Stroop interference were SADQ scores, quantity of alcohol consumed in a
typical drinking occasion (QPO), and the duration of either problem drinking or the
regular social drinking in the case of the control group. This equation is shown in
Table 3 and was significant [ F (3,61)=4.07, T<.01]. An unpredicted finding was the
negative relationship observed between QPO and the dependent variable.
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Table 3. Multiple Regression Equation Most Predictive of Stroop Interference
Variable Beta T SigT
Duration .264 2.27 .0263
QPO .416 2.14 .0365
SADQ .531 2.718 .0085
Multiple R .439
R.Square . 193
Adjusted R Square . 153
Standard Error 4.066
Analysis of Variance F=4.857
Significance= .0043
Variable entered on step number
1. Duration of habitual or problem drinking in years
2. QPO(quantity of alcohol typically consumed per drinking episode)
3. SADQtseverity of alcohol dependence questionnaire score)
N=65 Df 3,61
The third hypothesis predicted that the experimental group would evidence less
habituation to colour naming alcohol words relative to control Ss and in comparison
to neutral words. ANOVA revealed that the hypothesised interaction between word
category, clinical status of subject and trial block was not significant [F(l,63)=.773
P>.05]. Again, taking account of the missing data for Ss 1-5 the analyses were
repeated without these cases with a similar null finding [F(1,58)=1.258)P>.05]
Performance across both conditions and trials improved as evidenced by the main
effect of reduced colour naming latencies for all Ss ( see fig. 4).
Colour Naming Latency for Both Groups
Clinic Ss Control Ss
Fig. 4 Colour-naming latencyfor both groups in seconds
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DISCUSSION
The current study investigated the possibility of selective cognitive processing in the
context of addictive use of alcohol. The problem addressed was twofold. The first
issue was to establish whether or not a cohort of problem drinkers in treatment would
display attentional bias congruent with their clinical status. Following on from this, it
was proposed to explore the relationship between any putative interference and
behavioural and psychometric indices of alcoholism. A subsidiary hypothesis related
to the role of habituation in the emotional Stroop task.
In relation to the primary hypothesis concerning content-specific Stroop interference,
the results reported are not supportive. The predicted interactions did not attain
significance but the observed data showed a trend towards increased colour naming
latency consistent with a processing bias. The recent review of the emotional Stroop
task by Williams et al (1996) enables some tentative comparisons to be made with the
present results. The times 102 and 70 milliseconds (ms) obtained for the experimental
and control groups respectively straddle the grand mean of 84 ms computed by
Williams and his colleagues from the subset of the studies using card based
presentation.
A more direct comparison can be made by comparing the interference indices
obtained by Stetter et al (1994) and Stetter et al (1995) which were 62 ms and 22ms in
the first study and 77ms and 23ms in the second for alcoholics and controls
respectively (see figure 5). The salient point here is that the alcoholics in the present
study demonstrated more interference than their counterparts in the two samples
recruited by Stetter et al but the controls in the present study also evidenced very
robust Stroop interference with alcohol words. In fact the interference scores obtained
by the controls in the present study are neatly bracketed by those reported by Stetter
and co-workers for their alcoholic groups, differing by an average of less than eight
milliseconds.
Figure 5
Stroop Interference in Three
milliseconds Studies
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Clearer and more consistent predicted results emerged from the regression analyses,
with one notable exception. Here, it will be recalled, a series of predictions were made
stating that indices of the severity and chronicity of alcohol consumption would be
predictive of cognitive processing bias as measured by the modified Stroop task. The
findings were that the quantity of alcohol typically consumed per occasion (QPO), the
duration of problematic or habitual drinking and psychometrically determined severity
of alcohol dependence (SADQ) were predictive of Stroop interference. The exception
referred to above was that the first variable, QPO, proved to have an inverse
relationship to Stroop interference which was in the opposite direction to that
predicted. This result will be addressed below together with the theoretical and
clinical implications of the findings in general. The third prediction was not supported
due to the failure to find significant interaction between group status, word type across
trial one and two. Prior to any detailed discussion of these results it is necessary to re¬
visit the literature to relate the current findings to other recently published work.
Two groups of researchers published particularly relevant findings while the present
study was being carried out. Cox & Blount (1995) recruited three cohorts of problem
drinkers in Norway and the U.S.A. and compared their performance on a modified
computerised Stroop test involving the colour-naming of alcohol, emotionally
valenced and neutral words to that of selected controls. They found evidence of
interference in both problem drinking and control groups although the tendency was
for this to be more pronounced with the former, reaching statistical significance with
one cohort (Experiment 1). A second experiment produced results which parallel
those of the present study by demonstrating a substantial interference effect by the
control group when colour naming alcohol words and consequently obscuring any
hypothetical effect confined to the alcoholic group.
Stetter and colleagues recruited two samples of male alcoholic inpatients from a clinic
in Germany. In the first study (Stetter, Chaluppa et al.1994) they administered a card
based Stroop task consisting of alcohol-related words and semantically linked neutral
words to alcoholics and age-matched healthy controls. Results confirmed a trend
towards relatively slower colour naming by the clinic sample (N=30) for "alcohol"
words compared to neutral words but this failed to reach statistical significance.
Predicted relationships between alcohol consumption variables and Stroop
interference were not observed. A subsequent study with a larger sample (total N=80)
revealed more conclusive results. Again the investigators (Stetter, Ackerman et al.
1995) used a modified Stroop procedure and compared performance on colour-
naming alcohol and neutral words across the two groups. Statistical analysis revealed
a predicted colour naming delay with alcohol words relative to neutral words for the
alcoholic group. Again statistical associations between the derived "interference
score" (i.e. the difference between colour naming the alcohol words and the neutral
words) were not found to be significant.
Together with the present results, the above findings point to the existence of Stroop
interference by salient words in groups of detoxified problem drinkers, using both
computerised and card format modes of presentation. This is consistent with the
model proposed by Tiffany (1990) which predicts that abstinent or restrained
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alcoholics will process alcohol cues in a controlled, effortful way. The Tiffany model
is less specific about the role of particular cognitive processes such as selective
attention, in contrast to hypervigilance theory (Eysenck, 1992), the information
processing model of Williams et al (1988; 1997) and the model proposed by Wells &
Matthews (1994). These latter models will provide the theoretical framework for more
detailed discussion below. In advance of this however, two potentially important
differences between the research introduced above and the present study need to be
explored. Firstly, both Stetter et al (1995) and Cox & Blount (1995) recruited groups
of inpatient alcoholics who had recently undergone detoxification from alcohol.
Stetters' recruits had abstained from alcohol for an average of 14 days prior to
participating in the study. Cox & Blount (experiment 1) do not specify the duration of
abstinence prior to testing but it must be assumed that the earliest this occurred was
after detoxification which generally requires at least a week of abstinence. The clinic
Ss in the present study reported an average of just four days since last drinking
alcohol. The implication here is that the inpatient Ss deprived of alcohol for longer
would show more marked colour naming interference than the outpatient sample in
the present study who drank more recently. This would account for the discrepancy
between the present results and those based on inpatient subjects.
The second point relates to the characteristics of the control groups used. Stetter et al
(1995) do not specify where they recruited their control Ss from and Cox & Blount
(1995) describe their controls as employees in community centres (experiment 1) and
" blue-collar workers", (experiment 2). These investigators therefore did not control
for familiarity or expertise with regard to the stimulus words used. It needs to be
borne in mind however that by virtue of their status as social drinkers controls had
acquired some " expertise", possibly the reason why control Ss tend to display a
significant Stroop delay with alcohol words over neutral words. Nonetheless, it is
doubtful if this qualifies as expertise in the present context which implies enhanced
personal relevance in addition to frequency and familiarity.
Recalling the findings of Dalgleish (1995), this factor could generate Stroop
interference which would have a confounding effect on performance across
experimental and control groups. While it is not clear whether the inpatient episode
referred to by Stetter et al (1995) involved psychotherapeutic or educational
programmes it seems safe to assume that an inpatient population would inevitably be
exposed to terms associated with alcohol and alcoholism more than the outpatient
cohort recruited for the present study. Engaging in lengthy discussions in a therapeutic
milieu appears to fulfil the criteria for engendering expertise however and the present
results suggest that, left uncontrolled, this factor could exaggerate the difference
between clinical groups and controls on Stroop performance, thus accounting for the
significant interactions found by these researchers. The possibility that the duration of
pre-testing abstinence referred to above added to the effect size is also worth
considering.
In summary, of the four studies which addressed the question of Stroop interference
linked to alcohol problems, two have produced findings suggesting an attentional bias
associated with alcohol-relevant terms manifested by recently detoxified alcoholics in
comparison to controls. Two further studies have failed to find such an effect and the
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present study produced results which fell marginally short of significance. The studies
that unequivocally found the predicted effect, Stetter et al (1995) and Cox & Blount
(1995) did not adequately control for expertise as a factor likely to generate
attentional bias among clinic subjects, suggesting caution in interpreting these
findings. The present study also has shortcomings. Inclusion of a condition with
emotionally valenced words not related to alcohol would allow for more refined
interpretation of the results by allowing for the separation of effects attributable to
emotionality rather than personal relevance or familiarity. Similarly, recruitment of a
cohort of Ss who were neither experts nor alcoholics would make for a more robust
design.
The other study of direct relevance to the present findings is that of Gross et al (1993).
In addition to addressing nicotine addiction, this study is distinguished by the use of a
stronger design than those reviewed above, albeit with a small number of subjects
(N=20). The direct manipulation of smoking status was accomplished through
randomly allocating subjects to "maintain smoking" and "abstain" groups for 12 hours
prior to testing. As described in the Introduction, the predicted effect of increased
colour naming latency for smoking related words was observed for the abstinent
group but not the smoking group. The pattern of scores obtained was that subjects
allocated to the "smoking " condition showed faster colour naming of salient words
than neutral words and the abstinent group showed the opposite tendency. One
problem with this study that was noted earlier was the failure to select neutral words
from a semantically homogenous category. This means that the two word lists differed
not just in their degree of association with smoking but also in their potential for
generating priming effects.
The Role ofExpertise
The issue of expertise was controlled for in the present study by selecting controls
who were involved in service provision for problem drinkers. The more direct aim of
including this group was as a means of attempting to match the alcohol words for
frequency across groups. This manipulation was not designed to explore the impact of
expertise on relevant Stroop performance per se but to provide a more stringent
criterion for identifying Stroop interference as a definitive feature of disordered
alcohol use in a clinical population rather than an artefact of a drinking lifestyle or
professional knowledge of the subject. Any observed differences between colour
naming latency for alcohol words and neutral words across clinical and control groups
could therefore be more confidently regarded as implicated in the regulation of
addictive behaviour, specifically when effortful attempts are being made to modify it
through participation in therapeutic programmes.
One possible explanation for the spectrum of results described above is that delayed
colour naming is influenced by both expertise and the heightened emotional relevance
these terms acquire in individuals experiencing alcohol related difficulties. In the
research samples where Stroop effects have been demonstrated the clinical
participants were "primed" for the salient words by virtue of their (assumed)
engagement in therapeutic programmes in keeping with their in-patient status,
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whereas the control Ss were neither similarly primed nor likely to regard the critical
words as especially relevant. The present study to some extent orchestrated the
converse of this scenario: clinical subjects were, as out-patients, likely to be less
exposed to therapeutic programmes as intensive as their in-patient counterparts and,
crucially, the control subjects were, by definition, experts.
The dual influence of expertise and emotionality on colour naming interference was
investigated by Dalgleish (1995). He found a highly significant Stroop effect for his
subjects who were required to colour name words linked to their area of expertise,
ornithology. Bird names commanded more Stroop interference with this group than
positively or negatively toned emotional words. This finding contrasted with Mogg &
Marden (1990) who found no evidence of expertise impacting on colour-naming of
rowing words by members of a college rowing club. Dalgleish (1995) speculated that
the rowers might have acquired less familiarity with the terms in contrast to the
ornithologists that he recruited, who were also attending a conference when tested. On
this dimension, they appear seem more comparable to the control subjects used in the
present study who were tested in the course of a working day. As no study has yet
directly compared the Stroop performance of experts, alcoholic clinic attenders and a
third "normal" group it is difficult to be conclusive about the relationship between
expertise and emotional salience in the present context.
Evidence gathered from other client groups suggests that expertise does not account
for all of the interference typically found in Stroop experiments. This is clear from
studies of emotionally disordered individuals such as those recruited by Thrasher et al
(1994). The finding here, it will be recalled, was that Stroop interference was
differentially associated with clinical status of PTSD among a cohort who had shared
the same traumatic experience. In accounting for the present findings it seems
reasonable to conclude that expertise and emotionality associated with critical words
contributed to the interference evidenced by subjects in both groups, but to differing
degrees. In the control group the expertise effect generated more interference
consistent with that found by Dalgleish (1995); the clinical group were also affected
by the expertise effect but were additionally more susceptible to the generally
negative emotional impact of the alcohol words. These words were selected on the
basis of the degree to which they were rated by clinic attenders as "threatening " or
"desirable" with the former rating as the criterion for selection. A potential difficulty
with this procedure was that control subjects were not required to rate the words
similarly to the clinic sample, but it is assumed that, on a priori grounds these
commonly used terms were unlikely to have an anxiogenic impact.
The aim here was to devise a modified Stroop procedure that would have a defined
emotional valence in addition to semantic relatedness to the concerns that brought the
subjects into treatment. This would also allow for the findings to be more
meaningfully placed in the context of emotional Stroop research, the majority of
which focused on anxiogenic or threatening stimuli. Cox & Blount (1995, Experiment
2) did include positive and negative emotional words along with alcohol related words
and found that colour naming latency was generally equivalent across different word
types, although not confined to the alcoholic group. This implies that the Stroop
interference displayed by the alcoholic group in this study was influenced by both the
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emotionality of the words and the degree of personal relevance, familiarity or
expertise associated with them. The design does not allow for more specific
attributions to be made. Stetter et al (1995) used two sets of ten words which included
negative terms such as "blackout" as well as possibly less emotive words such as
"wine" in both lists and found no difference between the two in terms of colour
naming interference. While emotional valence was not directly manipulated in this
case comparable performance on the parallel forms suggests that colour naming
interference can be generated by a broad range of different words associated with
alcohol consumption and its consequences. The evidence suggests that the emotional
valence is less important a component in generating Stroop interference than the
semantic relatedness of the words to emotional concerns (Mathews & Klug, 1993). It
was also noteworthy that the anxiety and depression scores did not predict Stroop
interference with either alcohol relevant or neutral words.
The Relationship between Alcohol Use and Stroop Interference
The second aspect of the problem addressed in this investigation was an exploration
of the relationship between alcohol consumption variables and performance on the
measure of information processing, the modified Stroop. The combination of
variables that accounted for most of the variance in Stroop interference (R square =
.192) included self-reported duration of habitual or problem drinking, the average
quantity consumed per occasion (QPO) and scores on the Severity of Alcohol
Dependence Questionnaire (SADQ). These variables capture between them some
definitive aspects of alcohol abuse and dependence and confirm the existence of a
meaningful relationship between aspects of alcohol consumption and attentional bias.
The SADQ score, which had the strongest relationship with the index of Stroop
interference used as the dependent variable, is a robust psychometric instrument
standardised on a sample of London clinic alcoholics similar to those described here.
It provides a score that quantifies the extent of alcohol dependency according to self-
reports of the chronicity of problems and features such as drinking to relieve
withdrawal symptoms. Consistent with this, the relationship between duration of
problem drinking (or in the case of controls regular drinking) also proved to be
predictive of Stroop interference in combination with the other variables. Group status
(clinical or control) was not predictive of Stroop interference alone or in combination
with other variables.
The final variable to be discussed, QPO, was also predictive of colour naming latency
but in a direction contrary to that predicted. This anomalous result is difficult to
account for. One possibility is that subjects under-reported or underestimated their
consumption, but it is not clear why similar potential biases are reflected with the
other variables. Another tentative possibility is that there was a trend among subjects,
particularly controls, who reportedly drank less on a given occasion to have more
concern about the risks attendant on alcohol. This could influence the performance on
the modified Stroop in the manner observed as these subjects would evidence both
low QPO scores but high Stroop interference scores reflective of their current
concerns (the question asked about the amount that is typically consumed currently).
This is consistent with the fact that performance on the Stroop task is reflective of
more than one factor, be it familiarity, concern or emotionality.
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This is consistent with the fact that performance on the Stroop task is reflective of
more than one factor, be it familiarity, concern or emotionality.
Other variables not measured in the present study might also shed light on the issue.
For example Green, Elliman and Rogers (1996) investigated the relationship between
hunger, calorific pre-loading and colour naming of food and body shape words. These
researchers concluded that the relationship between attentional processing and hunger
was not linear, having found that calorific status of the subject was less influential in
determining Stroop interference than the subjective rating of hunger provided.
Unfortunately, a comparable measure of desire or craving for alcohol was not
obtained in the present study. Nonetheless, the findings of Green et al (1996) suggest
caution in accounting for Stroop phenomena. As these authors discuss, the findings of
non-linearity parallel the results of Mathews & Sebastian (1993) who found
unpredicted Stroop facilitation when their subjects were confronted with a real spider
rather than a laboratory stimulus array.
Leaving aside discussion of particular variables, there is little in the literature with
which to place the present findings in context. Of the four "alcohol Stroop" studies
described above only Stetter et al (1994) and Stetter et al (1995) attempted to explore
the relationship between some of the variables that featured in the regression analyses
under discussion. In both studies, Stetter and co-workers used simple correlations to
evaluate the interrelationships between the relevant variables. In the 1994 study
significant relationships emerged between levels of alcohol consumed prior to
admission and Stroop performance. Partly consistent with the present findings,
average daily consumption and maximum daily consumption were modestly
correlated with Stroop performance but this fell short of significance by a small
margin. On this occasion however the relationship was in the predicted, positive
direction. In the second study, utilising a larger (N=40) sample, no significant
relationships emerged, although a few (e.g. level of withdrawal seizures) fell just short
of the required level. The results are not however directly comparable to the present
findings because Stetter and colleagues confined their correlational analysis to the
alcoholic group and did not use multiple regression analysis.
Habituation to Stroop Interference
Predictions regarding habituation, as evidenced by decreasing colour-naming times
across trials, were speculative in nature owing to the lack of empirical data with the
relevant client group. While the same is true for the other predictions, there was a
body of evidence from research in eating and emotional disorders pointing to the
plausibility of attentional bias being implicated in addiction. As Green et al (1994)
point out however very little is known about intra-session habituation to Stroop-like
interference. The failure to find significant intra-session decrements in colour-naming
" alcohol" words rather than neutral words does not however allow for complacency
for two reasons. Firstly, the study was not primarily designed for rigorous testing of
hypotheses regarding the role of the durability commanded by Stroop interference
within testing sessions. Given the paucity of relevant data it was nonetheless
considered justifiable to hypothesise regarding the pattern of Stroop interference
observable within the test session. Thus, whereas Green et al (1994) employed five
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experiment more difficult to compare directly. Secondly, there was a trend noted in
the present study for performance by all Ss to be variable across repeated
administration of the Stroop although this gain in colour-naming latency did not
interact with group status or word-type. While the present study does not perhaps add
significantly to the issue, data on intra-session habituation is essential if attentional
bias effects are to be understood in the light of gains made in therapy, for instance. If
individuals habituate to salient word stimuli with relative ease, within a test or therapy
session, re-assessing the same individuals with words from the same categories is not
going to prove a valid means of assessing changes in patterns of cognitive processing
in the context of therapy gains. Returning to the findings of Green and co-workers,
they concluded that the differential responding to these word categories pointed to the
existence of qualitatively different concerns relating to food and body shape in
anorexic patients. Logically, the next step is to see whether the words that command
the more durable attentional bias continue to do so after remediation. The obstacle to
doing this with addictive behaviours is that currently it is impossible to specify with
confidence what particular word stimuli might serve this purpose.
Before fuller consideration is given to the interpretation of this aspect of the study it is
necessary again to broaden the focus to include developments in the wider arena of
information processing in emotional disorders. For the purposes of the present
discussion it was timely that Williams, Watts, MacLeod and Mathews (1997) have
reviewed the evidence in relation to attentional biasing with particular reference to the
modified Stroop paradigm.
Williams et al Information Processing Model (1997)
In the revised version of their 1988 model Williams et al (1997) re-affirm the
robustness of the data pointing to the existence of an attentional bias influencing the
perceptual "pick-up" of information and the tendency of the dispositional^ anxious
individual to subsequently allocate processing resources towards stimuli
disambiguated as threatening. This, they proposed, was based on the extent to which
the stimulus had been primed or integrated by the formation of a strong pattern of
encoding or internal representation. This automatic process is apparent in a wide
range of psychological disorder, particularly where anxiety or threat is a factor.
Williams et al (1997), however, point out that the failure to find an implicit memory
bias with some groups of anxious patients is puzzling as this task reflects priming or
processing fluency as much as tasks such as the emotional Stroop. The failure to
reliably demonstrate implicit memory with anxious patients and problems with
finding an explicit memory bias with depressed patients have led Williams et al
(1997) to revise their theory, particularly in the way elaboration is modelled (p.300).
Of more direct relevance to interpreting the present findings however is the effort
Williams and his co-workers have invested in accounting for the emotional Stroop
data which will now be addressed.
The parallel distributed processing (PDP) account of the original Stroop phenomenon
was outlined in the Introduction and in fig 2 (Cohen et al 1990). It was considered
potentially useful in relation to addictive behaviours by conceptualising strength of
processing as a means of conceptualising practice, or perhaps any high frequency
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behavioural response. Williams and colleagues have attempted to apply this
connectionist framework to the emotional Stroop (Williams et al, 1996; 1997). In
addition to strength of processing (in effect an operational definition of automaticity),
Williams et al propose two additional ways in which interference occurs in the PDP
model.
First, the resting level of activation for input units for emotional words might be
higher. Following Cohen et al (1990), Williams et al (1997) assume a sigmoid
activation function which means that in the middle range small changes in input lead
to proportionately greater changes in output in the word reading pathway. The
example used is the word "spider" having a higher level of resting activation than a
neutral word such as "fireplace" in spider-phobic individuals. In a colour naming task,
this higher level of resting activation for the word "spider" results in more activation
output in the word reading pathway which increases the interference at the response
module and hence increased colour naming latency.
Second, the input units can be subject to different levels of neuromodulatory control.
Again relying on the example of Williams et al (1997), the suggestion is that input
units that are historically associated with threat or loss become susceptible to
modulation by neurotransmitters such as norepinephrine. Processing of an
emotionally "tagged" word will lead to increased activity in the relevant pathways,
ultimately leading to more colour naming interference. Theoretically, these three
parameters of the PDP model can account for the emotional Stroop: increased practice
accounts for the expertise effects in combination with the increased resting level of
activation representing the personal concern component; the neuromodulatory
influence on activation is involved in the frequently demonstrated colour naming
latency associated with negatively valenced words by the clinically or sub-clinically
anxious.
The extension of the PDP model to the emotional Stroop thus allows for the
theoretical distinction to be made between colour naming latency associated with
familiarity or expertise and emotionality explored by Dalgleish (1995). It also goes
some way towards accounting for the findings that successfully treated clients with
phobias show significant reductions in colour naming latency of phobia related words
despite the necessary "expertise" acquired with these terms in therapy, (e.g. Lavy,
Hout & Arntz (1993); Watts et al (1986). The modelling of Stroop interference in
connectionist terms provides more flexibility in accounting for changes in response to
therapy and the role of expertise. An advantage of the PDP model of the emotional
Stroop is the specification of different processes operating within the framework. This
provides readily testable hypotheses with emotionality and expertise predicted to
contribute to different patterns of Stroop interference when subject to experimental
manipulation. This would yield more conclusive evidence for the Williams et al
(1996) proposals which, while consistent with some of the relevant data, are post hoc
in nature.
A contrasting model is proposed by Wells & Matthews (1994) who regard Stroop
interference as due to the voluntary execution of threat-monitoring plans. The Stroop
task is not, however,"pure" with respect to either the upper-level, strategic processes
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emphasised by Wells & Matthews (1994) or the lower-level, automatised processes
that are crucial in the theorising of Williams et al (1988; 1997). It appears that the
inherently ambiguous nature of the task extends to the interpretation of the results it
produces. Nevertheless, the Stroop task does capture a component of the involuntary
nature of the interference. The consistency with which colour naming latency with
emotionally valenced words has been demonstrated by so many subjects in different
studies raises the question of why, if this reflects strategic processing, it lacks the
flexibility that is one of the hallmarks of controlled processing. The many subjects on
whom the Stroop task has been inflicted have shown remarkable uniformity in the
performance deficits they have displayed in attempting to colour name words of
personal or emotional significance. This is consistent with the point made by McNally
(1995) who regarded this inability to override the cognitive bias as convincing
evidence of the involuntary and hence automatic nature of Stroop interference.
McNally (1995) contrasted this with the subliminal Stroop paradigm where presumed
lack of awareness precludes voluntary control strategies.
To recap, theorists such as Williams et al (1997) have applied PDP models in an effort
to account for empirical data such as expertise effects and reduced interference
following exposure based treatments. Three mechanisms were specified: strength of
processing, resting level of activation of input units and different levels of
neuromodulatory control. While this connectionist model seems well suited to
accounting for the growth of automaticity and direct processes generally, indirect or
controlled processing might not prove so amenable (Cohen, Servan-Schreiber &
McClelland, 1992). Applying a contrasting framework, Wells & Matthews (1994)
proposed a model which emphasised more strategic regulation of attentional
processing which suggests that Stroop interference is due to the operation of threat
monitoring plans in response to threat stimuli. The supposed voluntary nature of this
monitoring of threatening or emotionally salient material is open to question. McNally
(1995) regarded the apparent inability of Ss to choose not to become diverted by word
meanings as evidence of the involuntary, and hence automatised, nature of the
processing that occurs with salient words. The debate concerning the relative
automaticity of Stroop interference is important theoretically for both the models
proposed by Wells & Matthews (1994) and by Williams et al (1988; 1997) and
exemplifies the difference between them.
Information processing in relation to addictive and appetitive behaviour.
In theory the extension of the PDP model to accommodate the various and
occasionally contradictory findings generated by the emotional Stroop research is also
applicable to the present results. In particular the finding that both clinical and expert
groups displayed significant colour naming interference (102 ms and 70ms
respectively) is consistent with this disrupted performance being attributable to
different information processing patterns within a connectionist framework such as
that outlined by Cohen et al (1990). The greater degree of interference displayed by
the clinical group could thus reflect the cumulative effect of greater familiarity,
leading to more interference at the output stage, and higher resting activation levels of
the target words. This means that a word like "alcohol" would be more likely to
46
generate colour naming delay in alcoholic individuals for both of these reasons,
compared to a neutral word. With regard to the control or "expert" group however
there is only one dominant source of interference, the familiarity or extended practice
factor that is an integral component of the expertise.
This implicates only two of the possible sources or mechanisms of interference
specified by Williams et al (1996). The third source of interference is the
neuromodulatory control mechanism that selectively increases the activity output in
word pathways associated or "tagged" for threat. Theoretically it is equally plausible
to speculate on a neuromodulatory control process in relation to addictive behaviour.
Powell et al (1990) outlined the distinction between the aversive and appetitive
systems at the neurophysiological level, which were described as the behavioural
inhibition system (BIS), and the behavioural approach system (BAS). Although
Williams et al (1996) do not describe the possible mechanisms of neuromodulatory
control in detail, the involvement of the neurotransmitter norepinephrine and its
concentration in the locus coeruleus is specified, which are part of the BIS. The
appetitive system, the BAS, is also regulated by neurotransmitters, which are
selectively active in different areas of the brain and are subject to direct and hedonic
stimulation by drug ingestion (Nutt, 1996). The possibility that neurotransmitters such
as dopamine could be influential in mediating Stroop interference remains a
speculative hypothesis at this stage. In one sense at least it is less so than the proposal
of Williams and his colleagues as drug seeking behaviour is reinforced directly by the
action of the ingested substance on specific receptor sites. This eminently
conditionable response persists in the absence of the drug of choice and is arguably
the definitive component of addictive behaviour. This tendency to deliver powerful
reinforcements directly was contrasted by Wise (1988) to the stimulation due to
primary reinforcers like food or water which require transformation into nerve
impulses in order to generate hedonic experience.
Drugs such as cocaine or opiates "saturate" receptor sites directly and alcohol directly
stimulates the dopaminergic system. Williams et al (1996) were however able to base
their speculation about neuromodulation on a substantial database of research studies,
albeit without direct manipulation or measurement of the neurotransmitters
implicated. Conversely the research exploring the neurobiology of craving reviewed
by Wise (1988) does not address cognitive processing, not least because much of the
findings considered were based on laboratory animals. This does not prevent Wise
from discussing the apparently long "memory" evidenced by both human and animal
subjects for the positive reinforcing effects of drug and alcohol ingestion (i.e. the
persistence of the conditioned response) compared to the relatively less enduring
effects of withdrawal discomfort. This is entirely consistent with the high relapse rates
observed in those who attempt continuing abstinence from drugs which were used
addictively.
Goldman & Rather (1993) proposed that the hypothetical memory for drug effects
consists of expectancies which, crucially in addicts, cluster positive consequences
relatively quickly and tightly together and in relative isolation from expectancies
about the aversive consequences of drug use. They described supportive findings
when they employed multidimensional scaling techniques with a sample of heavy and
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light drinkers. Further evidence of a relatively automatic, proceduralised, response to
cues mediated by expectancies comes from work with lexical decision tasks and
disambiguation of words. Hill & Paynter (1992) found that alcohol dependent Ss were
faster to make a lexical decision when primed by alcohol related words than were
non-dependent social drinkers. The aptly named Earleywine (1994) asked his Ss to
define ambiguous words such as "toast" and found significant correlations between
the definitions (alcohol or non-alcohol related) and alcohol consumption variables.
The sample were female undergraduates who reported drinking on average less than
seven standard units of alcohol per week which raises doubts about the relevance of
the results. Additionally, research relating alcohol consumption to spreading
activation of expectancies in response to priming manipulations (Weingardt, Stacey &
Leigh, 1996) has implications for behavioural decisions about drinking.
The PDP model, as developed further by Williams and his associates can
accommodate some key findings in the emotional Stroop literature, in particular the
superficial similarity in colour naming performance between expert and emotionally
disordered individuals, which appears to change in response to treatment with regard
to the latter (Watts et al,1986). Recent findings suggest caution in this regard as
Lovell, Williams and Hill (1997) found that Stroop interference with body-shape
words was observed in a recovered group of anorexics. This group was recovered
according to self-reports and clinical and psychometric evidence. In contrast to the
earlier study by Watts et al (1986) the design was limited by the lack of baseline
Stroop data for the clinical group who were self-selected through newspaper
advertisements and then compared to currently symptomatic anorexics. The
researchers therefore were not in a position to control the type and intensity of the
treatment or factors which might have motivated the recovered individuals to put
themselves forward for the research.
Summary and Conclusions
The PDP model proposed by Cohen et al (1990) and applied to the emotional Stroop
paradigm by Williams et al (1997) can account for the present finding that both clinic
alcoholics and experts in treating alcohol use disorders evidence significant
interference in colour naming salient words, with a non-statistically significant trend
for this to be more marked with the former. Distinguishing between the performance
of clinical and expert subjects is supported by assumed increases in the resting levels
of activation in concern related input units of the PDP architecture combined with a
possible mechanism for neuromodulation and increases in strength of processing
respectively. Similarly, the emergence of significant predictive relationships between
aspects of alcohol consumption such as the duration of habitual drinking and Stroop
interference is consistent with an acquired information processing bias of the type the
original PDP model was constructed to account for by proposing variables such as
strength of processing. These processes, assumed to reflect the prior learning history
and personal relevance of the word stimuli, provide an explanation for the emotional
Stroop effect and why it can be shown to diminish following successful
psychotherapy or adjustment, despite the necessary engendering of "expertise" as part
of the treatment. This account is consistent with the pattern of Stroop interference
demonstrated by Ss in both groups in the present study, although this would be more
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conclusive if treatment was directly manipulated with repeated administration of the
Stroop test. Experimental control of the degree of expertise, perhaps by including a
group of "non-experts" would also be a useful factor to include as an independent
variable.
Clinical Implications
The distinction between automatic and controlled cognitive processes was discussed
earlier and the implications for addictive behaviour were briefly explored. Of clear
relevance was the apparent autonomy of behaviour governed by automatised
processes, particularly when effortful control was called for. Individuals embarking on
therapeutic programmes aimed at modifying addictive behaviour such as compulsive
drinking experience at first hand the conflict between automatic and controlled
processes. Beck and his colleagues captured some of this competition in the following
quote: " Cravings and urges tend to be automatic and may become autonomous; the
thrust of therapy is to provide voluntary methods for managing them." (Beck et al,
1993, p.40). The focus of therapeutic intervention specified here is the hypothesised
delay between the experience of the craving and the formulation of a plan aimed at
satiating it. While this over-simplifies the complex processes involved it does provide
a stepping stone from theory to practice. The broad question that needs to be
addressed relates to how the present results and other recent findings might alter the
way in which addictive behaviours are responded to therapeutically. The discussion
will focus on the implications for assessment and intervention strategies.
Assessment
Recent approaches to assessment have emphasised a systems approach embracing the
biological, social and psychological aspects of addictive behaviour (e.g. Donovan &
Gordon, 1988). Apart from the obviously biomedical aspects of substance misuse
assessment, involving laboratory screening of body fluids or other specimens such as
hair assessment, has relied on self-reports to a large degree. The resulting data is thus
susceptible to the same influences discussed in detail by Williams et al (1997 ,
Chapter 10). This means that when an individual gives an account of his or her own
drug use, or completes a questionnaire probing similar issues, the resulting data will
reflect a range of distortions. These will bias the responses, particularly when
attributional judgements are called for ( e.g. "Why do you drink excessively" ?). The
situation is further complicated in the field of substance misuse by socio-cultural
beliefs about "denial" being a feature of addiction. There is some irony in a situation
where an interviewer's schematic beliefs lead him to doubt the credibility of an
interviewee whose self-reports are nonetheless distorted, but due to different
processes.
There is a risk of overstating the potential for confusion here: by drawing on different
sources of information the experienced interviewer can avoid much of this.
Nonetheless, an important point is that as theorists begin to speculate on the role of
automatic processes in addiction (e.g.Tiffany, 1990), an approach based largely on
self-report is going to miss an important aspect of the behaviour i.e. its automaticity.
There is thus a clear theoretical case to be made for some measure of automatic
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cognitive processing to be considered as part of the assessment of addictive disorders.
What is equally clear is that, given the current state of knowledge, this would be
unjustified at present.
The findings discussed here included significant relationships between standard
measures of alcohol dependence and self-reported behaviour on the one hand and
Stroop interference on the other. The most important relationship to emerge was
between the SADQ, which measures alcohol dependence, and Stroop interference
specific to alcohol relevant words. Other findings (Cox et al 1995; Stetter et al 1995)
implicated Stroop interference in alcohol misuse. Similarly, the degree of Stroop
interference displayed by eating disordered individuals has been proposed as a
quantitative index of psychopathology (Ben Tovim et al., 1988; 1991). In fact, given
the finding described by Williams et al (1996) for PTSD sufferers to consistently
show higher levels of Stroop interference than those with other forms of anxiety
disorder (the former displaying 200-300 ms whereas the latter rarely exceed 100 ms)
there are logical reasons for predicting that a task such as the Stroop has a natural
advantage with appetitive disorders. This is because both PTSD and restrained use of
drugs or food are associated with unwanted thoughts or impulses (see e.g. Polivy &
Herman, 1985). Insofar as the emotional Stroop reflects difficulty in suppressing the
cognitive processing of the word meanings it suggests itself as an appropriate
technique for exploring disorders where effective impulse control is synonymous with
therapeutic gain.
To date however no investigation has monitored Stroop interference over an extended
period with a group of problem drinkers, perhaps coinciding with therapeutic
intervention. Until this more robust type of study is carried out the implications for
assessment will remain unclear. Consideration also needs to be given to other
approaches to assessing the role of automatic processing. The procedure used in the
present study, the modified Stroop, reflects to some degree the level of automatic
task-irrelevant processing that takes place but responses are also reflective of strategic
influences. It is also prudent to acknowledge the necessary limitations of scope and
design in both the present study and other relevant work reviewed here which imply a
cautious approach in generalising the findings.
Therapeutic Intervention
Consideration of this topic is necessarily more speculative than the discussion of
assessment as there is a very meagre empirical database upon which to draw any
conclusions. It needs to be recalled that the modified Stroop is essentially a
measurement or assessment tool, albeit still under research and development, but as
such does not have a necessary or direct implication for therapeutic programming.
Nonetheless, the growing acknowledgement of the role of attention in the regulation
of emotion and behaviour (see Wells & Mathews, 1994) has important implications
for how addictive behaviour is conceptualised and therefore how treatment is
modelled and applied.
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The present study was initiated specifically to learn more about the apparent
attentional bias displayed by individuals engaged in treatment. Anecdotally, this
seems to be associated with beliefs asserting the ubiquity of alcohol in the
environment. The information processing approach described by Williams et al (1988;
1997) raises the processing bias being causally implicated in the acquisition and
maintenance of such beliefs. In the example quoted by Williams et al (1997, p. 16), a
man states that "..everywhere I look there are dangers". The information processing
model offers an alternative account of events by proposing that this anxious man is
selectively attending to environmental events that are easily accommodated into a
biased schematic structure. The informed therapist would therefore point out to the
client that a more accurate reflection of what was guiding his appraisals would be
"everywhere there are dangers, I will look" (Williams et al 1997, p.42). The therapist
could add that this process occurs very rapidly and can detect danger or threat stimuli
very efficiently, with little regard for the many non-threatening features that are
available in the environment. The possibility that addictive behaviour is similarly
influenced by automatised processing biases suggests that the addicted individual will
acquire comparable idiosyncratic beliefs about the world apropos their drug of choice.
Put simply, this predicts that those abstaining from, say, alcohol will display beliefs
such as "everywhere I look I see alcohol" which can be subject to a similar inversion
to that quoted above. This means that during and following treatment for addictive
disorders individuals so engaged are susceptible to having their responses triggered by
environmental stimuli that, while not perhaps as ubiquitous as implied above, are
certainly common enough to frequently capture the attention of those predisposed to
respond by virtue of their addictive tendencies. A further implication is that, even in
settings where cues associated with the proscribed substance are in fact rare,
individuals with an acquired information processing bias will nonetheless detect and
process these cues with greater facility.
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Much of the above speculation follows directly from theorists such as Williams and
his colleagues have explicated the role of cognitive processes in the field of
emotional disorders. However, in the light of the results presented above and other
new findings more direct evidence can be brought to bear in an effort to explore the
implications for therapy specifically with addictive behaviour. Firstly, it can be
recalled that evidence from three separate studies has pointed to abstinent problem
drinkers displaying Stroop interference. These findings are somewhat equivocal due
to procedural and interpretative difficulties. The role of expertise, for example was
not addressed or controlled for in the Cox et al (1995) and Stetter et al (1995) studies.
To summarise the key findings of the present study, when expertise was controlled
for by comparing experts' responses to the Stroop task with those of clinical
recruits the predicted interactions between word type and clinical status were
not found. The data showed moderate levels of colour naming latency with
both groups however which in the form of a derived interference index
approached statistical significance when compared across groups. The
predictive relationships observed between aspects of alcohol use and Stroop
interference is also noteworthy. The important question is to what extent the
pattern of Stroop interference observed can be generalised to that of restrained
drinkers in the real-life settings. This is amenable to further investigation but
would require a longitudinal design involving the monitoring of cognitive
processes such as Stroop interference in the context of therapeutic change or
relapse.
Given the dearth of evidence in relation to the clinical implications of cognitive
processing biases in addictive behaviours and the related absence of a theoretical
model it is again necessary to turn to more thoroughly researched areas. Three texts,
Wells and Mathews (1994), Williams et al (1988; 1997) and Eysenck (1992) are of
direct relevance here.
Wells and Matthews (1994)
In the first text the authors tackled the question of whether attentional disorder is
caused by or is a consequence of emotional problems (Wells & Matthews, 1994
Chapter 11) and concluded that the relationship was bi-directional based on a review
of experimental, clinical and longitudinal data. Attentional processes can be viewed as
influential at different stages in the acquisition and maintenance of emotional
disorders however. There are nonetheless considerable methodological problems in
addressing the causality question such as the likelihood that both emotionality and
cognitive processes such as attentional bias both change in response to psychotherapy,
as Wells & Matthews point out. This illustrates the point that just because cognitive
processes are not targeted directly as levers of therapeutic change does not mean they
are not implicated. While Wells & Matthews (1994) cite their own efforts at
therapeutic intervention aimed at altering self-focused attention the single case and
small-N studies do not provide very generalisable evidence of remediation, although
the reported gains were present up to twelve months later. Given the lack of direct
evidence connecting attentional disorder or biasing to clinical gain, it seems
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processes they are not represented in a form available to conscious awareness and are
therefore unreportable (see Williams et al, 1997, Chapter 10 for a detailed discussion).
Such nonconscious activity can however indirectly impact on conscious awareness
permitting a form of retrospective inference from that which is actually reported. This
implies that it might be useful to encourage clients in therapy to guess the nature of
possible unreportable, automatic thoughts that might be implicated in emotional
disorder. Interestingly, Williams et al (1997, p.272) speculated that individuals with
"maladaptive control strategies" in relation to eating, gambling or drinking may be
overgeneralising rules acquired in some earlier context. While this point is not
developed further, it is consistent with the behavioural autonomy apparent in
addictive behaviour regardless of the consequences or the appropriateness of such
actions in a particular setting.
Hypervigilance Theory
Eysenck (1992) acknowledged the influence of the Williams et al (1988) model but
provided a more comprehensive account of other attentional phenomena such as
scanning, distractibility and breadth of attention in his hypervigilance theory(see p. 19
above).
This model also predicts Stroop interference with salient words by normals with
heightened anxiety or clinically anxious patients. The selective bias is latent rather
than manifest however and with reduced anxiety the attentional processes specified by
Eysenck return to normal, although there are exceptions. Recovered anxious patients,
for instance are manifestly more susceptible to threatening distracters compared to
normals (Mathews, May, Mogg & Eysenck, 1990). More generally however the
concept of attentional processing that prioritises the detection of particular
environmental events, such as those perceived as threatening by the anxious
individual, can be usefully applied to addiction, a defining feature of which is the
propensity for those affected to prioritise the pursuit of their drug of choice.
Social Learning and Conditioning Models ofAddiction
The social-cognitive models of treatment such as those described by Marlatt (1985)
emphasise the role of conscious cognitive processes in the regulation of addictive
behaviour. Some indications of the implicit nature of these thought processes are
provided by the concept of seemingly irrelevant decisions. These apparently trivial
decisions can bias the individual towards relapse e.g. deciding to avoid heavy traffic
by using a different route home which inter alia passes some favourite bars or places
where drugs are usually available. Similarly as referred to above, Marlatt and his
collaborators advocated the teaching of anticipatory coping skills, using the analogy
of a driver attending to road signs in order to cope with the impending hazards. This
and similar approaches to treatment (eg Monti, Abrams et al 1989) diligently apply
the techniques derived from social learning theory but leave cognitive processing out
of their theorising, except for the more general references to higher level processes
such as decision making. This exemplifies a tendency to emphasise the role of
secondary appraisals and strategic responding in general at the cost of ignoring the
potential role of processes such as priming and disambiguation of stimuli.
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Cue exposure approaches reflect an essentially behaviourist view of the acquisition
and subsequent fate of addictive behaviour. There is no account of attentional
processing of cues in relation to the detection of and subsequent processing of salient
cues. Tiffany (1990) has speculated about the possibility of abstinent addicts
processing cues in a controlled rather than automatic manner. As pointed out above
(p. 10) a significant minority, about one third of abstinent alcoholics, demonstrated
conditioned responses when exposed to pertinent cues (Rohsenow et al 1992). This
implies a selective, attentional mechanism which is at present not acknowledged in
models such as that proposed by Tiffany. Nevertheless evidence suggests that those
who perform passively or slowly in response to scenarios involving cue presentation
do less well in terms of treatment when followed up (Monti et al 1989). This could
reflect a heightened level of distractibility by those who were less efficient in their
response due to the operation of an attentional bias and selective processing of
specific alcohol cues at the expense of deployment of effective coping skills.
Similarly the "driving hazard" analogy referred to above could, from a cognitive
processing perspective, lead to distraction by the warning sign with the effect of
disrupting coping in the face of the impending danger.
Insofar as the present results suggest that there is a tendency for those most dependent
on alcohol to display more Stroop interference with relevant words, the findings
provide some empirical support for the involvement of a processing bias in alcohol
dependence. The relative novelty of these findings is apparent in contrast to the
extensive clinical and research literature based on behavioural and social learning
models. These approaches have generated effective therapeutic interventions and
continue to grow in the scope of their applications. Data concerning the role of
selective attention in addiction is, at this stage, of primarily theoretical value.
Effective practice is the other side of the coin however, which leads back to the
statement from Beck et al (1993) quoted at the beginning of this section. The currency
or discourse of therapeutic encounters is essentially strategic and controlled rather
than automatised. More specifically, the goal of therapy is to enhance the degree of
choice the individual can exercise in the face of the often involuntary imperatives of
addiction. The present findings provide some empirical support for this view.
Treatment approaches such as those of Marlatt & Gordon 1985) and Monti et al
(1989) which emphasise the acquisition of specific coping skills can also derive
support from the idea that a continuum of automaticity underlies the acquisition of
addictive behaviour. As has been discussed the demonstration of meaningful
relationships between the chronicity of drinking behaviour and Stroop interference are
consistent with this notion. Acknowledging the role of automatised cognitive
processing therefore validates the emphasis on teaching alcoholics coping skills,
which with repeated practice will acquire more fluency and autonomy consistent with
the process of cognitive skill acquisition described by Anderson (1982) as progressing
from declarative to procedural.
Furthermore, viewing addiction from a dual-processing perspective might help
resolve some of the negative stereotypes that lurk within some more traditional
approaches to treatment, such as "12-step" models (Alcoholics Anonymous, 1939).
These ideas have had a profound influence on socio-cultural responses to alcoholism
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and addiction generally, although not always consistently (cigarette smokers generally
avoid being labelled as "unmotivated", "in denial", or worse). The first of the 12 steps
is " We admitted we were powerless over alcohol". The cognitive perspective on this
assertion would be more prosaic, emphasising the relatively circumscribed nature of
the loss of control and linking this state to the dynamic interaction between controlled
and automatic processes. The apparent paradox in the 12-Step approach is that once
the powerlessness is acknowledged it can be transformed into control, but only by
appealing to a "higher power". Tacit acknowledgement perhaps that in a contest
between the automatic and the controlled, mere human willpower is regarded as
insufficient to determine the outcome.
Overview ofTherapeutic Implications
Most of the above discussion could be divided into two overlapping categories.
Firstly, the investigation of attentional processes in relation to addiction offers a new
perspective which has important implications for how addictive behaviour is
conceptualised and ultimately how it is responded to therapeutically. The analogy
with anxiety disorders is once again useful here. Consider the clinical presentation of
panic attacks occurring "out of the blue" combined with experimental evidence such
as that of Ohman & Soares (1993; 1994) pointing to the unconscious and automatic
nature of phobic fear. Substituting the experience of drug related craving for panic
illustrates the relevance of these findings for addictive disorders. Evidence for
selective processing of information related to specific aspects of the addictive
syndrome which is resistant to voluntary suppression and control is of direct relevance
to those affected.
Recalling the description of the role of naturalistic cues as "the final common
pathway" of relapse (Cooney et al, 1987) it is crucial that the cognitive processes that
support the detection and processing of that stimulus are described. As referred to
above, not all drug-dependent individuals display conditioned cue reactivity and even
when cue exposure was investigated as part of a controlled trial, different outcomes
were reported (Powell, et al, 1993; Dawe et al (1993). More generally, discussion of
issues such as the role of awareness and the degree to which apparently automatised
responses are amenable to verbal persuasion echoes that in the broader field of clinical
psychology. This debate, concerning the role and relevance of verbally mediated
therapy, is ongoing with recent well argued, if conflicting, contributions from
McNally (1995) and Beck & Clark (1997). A more integrative review of the
conceptual origins of the behavioural and cognitive components of therapeutic change
(Brewin, 1996) places the debate in a broader and more meaningful context.
Second, the foregoing has implications for the conceptualisation and conduct of
existing models of the therapeutic response to addiction such as exposure based and
social learning models. A focus on cognitive processing could help reconceptualise
therapeutic intervention in a manner analogous to that proposed by Beck & Clark
(1997) for schema-based cognitive therapy for anxiety disorders. Recent reviews such
as that of Saunders & Houghton (1996) suggested that relapse is "far too complex" to
model or that the reliability and validity of the taxonomy of relapse proposed by
Marlatt & Gordon (1985) are not adequate (Madden, 1996). Other psychological
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disorders are equally, if not more, opaque. This has not prevented the specification of
clear, refutable models such as that of Williams et al (1988;1997), or indeed the
model proposed by Marlatt whose endeavours were described as "attempting the
impossible" by Saunders & Houghton (1996). A more measured response to current
conceptualisations of relapse would emphasise the neglect of specifying a role for
cognitive processes, particularly those displaying features of automaticity. Over
reliance by researchers on retrospective self-reports by addicted patients of their
previous experiences of relapse could account in part for the poor predictive validity
such reports reveal in relation to subsequent relapse. Theoretically, if resumption of
drug use reflects the influence of automatic processes, reports based on explicit
memory for relapse situations should be treated cautiously, not least because negative
affect is linked to both resumption of addictive behaviour and mood congruent recall
bias.
Future Research on Cognitive Processing and Addiction
Overview
Reappraising the literature three years after the initial search for findings to shed light
on the role of attention in addiction suggested that matters had not changed much: the
field of cognitive processing research in clinical contexts has maintained its
apparently symbiotic relationship with anxiety and depressive disorders. This trend
was reflected in the revised version of Williams et al (1997) information processing
account of anxiety and depression. Similarly Williams et al (1996) reviewed the now
extensive literature on the emotional Stroop and psychopathology but confined their
article to studies of anxiety and depression. There are of course clear theoretical
grounds for this selectivity as a fundamental aim of the model proposed by Williams
and colleagues is the lawful relationship between cognitive processes such as priming
and subsequent elaboration on the one hand and anxiety and depression on the other.
Regarding the one study they cited in relation to alcohol abuse and Stroop
performance Williams et al (1996) concluded that there were insufficient data in this
area from which to draw any conclusions.
Despite the accumulation of more data since the Williams et al (1996) review there
remains a vacuum in the field of addiction and cognitive processing. The only explicit
information processing model that addresses addictive behaviour (Tiffany, 1990) does
not specify a role for attention, ft may well be that a former dependent drinker might
process urges in a controlled, strategic manner as the model proposes. Consider for
instance the existence of a pre-attentive mechanism, or network of "lower level" units
in connectionist terms, that is selectively activated by appetitive cues. This will
influence subsequent resource allocation, possibly by the activation of more
elaborated representations of the stimulus. The resulting negative impact on
concurrent processing is along the lines predicted by Tiffany but for different reasons.
Modelling the cognitive processes involved in addiction will need to account for the
possibility of a "strong" form of attentional bias which has acquired a high degree of
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automaticity and is therefore non-volitional, pre-conscious and a key component of a
generally hypervigilant system. In the following section some possibilities for future
research are explored.
Attentional Bias and Therapeutic Change
There are currently no research findings on the relationship between attentional bias
and therapy outcomes in addiction. This is a substantial obstacle to understanding the
role of selective processing in therapy. A specific problem lies in understanding the
extent to which processing biases remain after treatment and impact on relapse rates.
The key variables are cue-conditioned phenomena such as autonomic arousal and
subjective experiences of compulsion to engage in drug use. If, as seems possible, this
heightened state of arousal is associated with particular cognitive processes such as
narrowing of attention and disruption in processing of other tasks it deserves further
exploration. This would involve in vivo stimuli and could replicate the work of
Mathews & Sebastion (1993) who found unpredicted speeding of colour naming when
fear was evoked by the physical presence of phobic stimuli. Combined with the
findings of Green et al (1996), who found that the most hungry Ss evidenced the least
Stroop interference, this points to a more complex, non-linear relationship between
subjective experience of arousal and attentional bias.
Methodological and Conceptual Diversity
Currently the modified Stroop paradigm is the most commonly used method of
assessing attentional bias despite some doubts as to what cognitive processes it
actually measures. This presents the prospective researcher with a dilemma: more
"process pure" paradigms such as the dot probe and dual-task procedures that for
instance separate spatial location of stimulus components do not have the benefit of
the substantial Stroop data from a broad spectrum of psychological disorders.
Information processing tasks such as colour-naming necessarily involve problem
solving and hence a strategic component (Logan, Zbrodoff & Williamson, 1984).
These researchers found that this strategy-dependent effect was limited by increasing
task demand, such as having to colour name one of a total of four colours rather than
from a maximum of two. More generally there is evidence that task procedure and
format can impact on performance e.g. computerised Stroop presentation generates
different results to card based formats (Dalgleish, 1995) This points to the possibility
that different cognitive processes are involved in what could reasonably be viewed as
(at least superficially) similar tasks insofar as they reflect selective attentional
processing.
On balance therefore, it seems safe to endorse the modified Stroop for further research
both on the basis of the large database linking this paradigm to psychological
dysfunction and the consistency with which it reflects selective processing of a largely
involuntary nature. This reflects only one aspect of automaticity. There is, for
instance, no published work on possible subliminal Stroop effects in this field. Such
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research would broaden understanding of the role of automaticity in addictive
disorders. Testing hypotheses about semantic processing without conscious awareness
would prove to be important theoretically and would help to develop a broader
understanding of the role of automaticity in addiction.
Conclusions
The findings discussed above point towards a potentially fulcral role for automatised
cognitive processes in addiction. Insofar as attentional bias was shown to be
meaningfully related to patterns of alcohol consumption and indices of alcohol
dependence they are consistent with findings in the broader arena of psychological
disorder: relatively automatised cognitive processes appear to be implicated in the
persistence of dysfunction while remaining resistant to effortful control and
introspection. Based on the small number of empirical findings available an emerging
hypothesis is that the repetitive self-administration of drugs is increasingly supported
by cognitive operations and architecture that have acquired a bias towards the pursuit
of the relevant consummatory goal. It needs to be borne in mind however that
theorising based on such a small number of empirical findings needs to be cautious.
The extant studies, including the present one, are not sufficiently robust enough to
form the basis of a conclusive overview. Moreover, the central hypothesis regarding
attentional bias was not supported, although the recruitment of control Ss on the basis
of their expertise was a factor here. Nonetheless, the possibility that attempts at self-
regulation or cessation of drug use conflict directly with the automatic cognitive
processes and in so doing are frequently overwhelmed is worthy of further
investigation. This merely acknowledges what anyone who has struggled with
addictive behaviour would endorse but a cognitive perspective provides a means of
conceptualising this in more precise quantitative and objective terms. Such
pronouncements will remain speculative until further research investigates cognitive
processes such as selective attention in the context of lasting behavioural change.
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a. Computed using alpha = .05













TRIAL 604.815 1 604.815 45.232 .000 45.232 1.000
TRIAL * GROUP 18.836 1 18.836 1.409 .240 1.409 .215
Error(TRIAL) 775.542 58 13.371
WRDTYPE 45.202 1 45.202 4.347 .041 4.347 .536
WRDTYPE * GROUP 25.217 1 25.217 2.425 .125 2.425 .334
Error(WRDTYPE) 603.114 58 10.399
TRIAL * WRDTYPE 988.278 1 988.278 59.961 .000 59.961 1.000
TRIAL * WRDTYPE *
GROUP
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I am interested in finding out how those who have had problems with alcohol might differ
from those who have not experienced such problems. You will be asked to complete some
questionnaires and to respond to some words. If you have any questions they will be
addressed afterwards.
CONSENT FORM
I agree to take part in this research project. I have read the summary above. This will
involve completing a number of questionnaires and other tasks. I understand that the
procedure is not part of the treatment programme itself and I can decide not to participate
or to withdraw at any time. I also understand that I may be asked to provide a blood or







The aim of the experiment was to see whether those who have experienced problems with
alcohol are more likely to notice or pay attention to familiar and probably emotive words like
" binge" or "drunk" than more neutral words such as "chair". This might seem an obvious
thing to expect but what is being studied here is when this occurs. It was expected that you
and the other participants would be distracted from naming the colours of the alcohol-related
words automatically as this might happen before you were aware of the meaning of the
words. This could mean that you are directing your attention to words associated with
drinking alcohol quicker than to other, less emotionally charged words.
Applying this this to "real life" situations raises the possibility that people who are trying to
avoid problem drinking will nonetheless have their attention drawn to ideas associated with
drinking. This is speculation at this stage so don't worry that you are not fully in control of
the recovery process. Ultimately it is your decision whether or not you choose to drink - this
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